holding that the trial court impermissibly awarded increases in pension benefits accruing after divorce since such benefits are not “acquired during the marriage” and hence are separate
How later courts described this case
- holding that the trial court impermissibly awarded increases in pension benefits accruing after divorce since such benefits are not “acquired during the marriage” and hence are separate
- applying the bright line approach where a large increase in pension benefits was due solely to the employee spouse's additional years of work after the divorce, and any cost of living increases gained in four years of marriage would be negligible, based on the average salary of the employee spouse
- "such solution would have the merit of disentangling the parties and their affairs at a finite point in time"
- recognizing the issue presented in Ruggles and Mick, but declining to rule on it
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
This case, and others involving the same or similar issues, have been a source of difficulty for the Court membership. Justice Bakes authored Shill I. In my view he wrote an excellent opinion, well-fortified with respectable authority. Notwithstanding that in Ramsey v. Ramsey he had written a vigorous dissent, 1 in Shill I, he put his Ramsey dissent out of mind, and commendably said of Ramsey for a 4-1 majority, “We reversed and remanded the case [Ramsey \ to the trial court for a calculation of an appropriate lump sum award to the wife of her share of the community property portion of the retirement pension computed on the present value of the wife’s interest in the pension, ...” 100 Idaho at 438, 599 P.2d 1004 . He recited what the courts of the community property states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas had done, and concluded the Court’s opinion with this observation:
However, where the time for retirement is uncertain and where the value of the employee’s monthly benefits is dependent upon the number of years of employment at retirement, a factor which may not be known at the time of the divorce, and where maintenance of the pension benefits after divorce will be from the employee spouse’s separate property, or the property of a subsequent community, a reasonably accurate calculation of the present value of the pension rights derived from community effort may not be possible. In these cases, the trial court *122 should consider withholding the retirement rights from the property disposition and decreeing that the parties hold the rights to the benefits as tenants in common. If and when the employee spouse does obtain retirement benefits the trial court can then determine what portion of the rights were derived from community property and divide the payments accordingly.
Shill v. Shill, 100 Idaho 433, 439 , 599 P.2d 1004, 1010 (1979).
Justice Shepard, who had also dissented in the Ramsey case, again dissented in Shill I, and in doing so in one fell swoop expressed his disfavor with Justice Bakes’ Ramsey dissent and also with Justice Bakes’ Shill I opinion:
I would add that the majority holding in Ramsey was over and notwithstanding the vigorous dissent of the author of today’s majority opinion. I find myself no more able to agree with his reasoning today than at the time of Ramsey.
Shill, supra, at 440 , 599 P.2d at 1011 .
Today, almost ten years since Shill I, Shill II is before us, and, in actual fact, has been since we heard oral argument on November 5, 1987. Counsel for both sides may well surmise that it has not been easy to reach a consensus which commands a majority and holds it, for very long, that is.
Justice Bakes, notwithstanding that he authored Shill I, which was explicit in the guidance given the trial court for proceedings on remand, which the trial court appears to have closely followed, is now voting with Justice Shepard, and commendably puts out of mind the taunting administered to Justice Bakes in Shill I. Obviously Justice Bakes now sees more merit in the views espoused by Justice Shepard than he did previously, and presently sees more merit in Justice Shepard’s views than in Justice Huntley’s.
Cast in the position of delivering the swing vote, I cannot help but be impressed with Justice Bakes open-mindedness and his ability to now fully comprehend the merit in Justice Shepard’s views that heretofore escaped him, and myself as well. Therefore, being full well cognizant of the length of time that case has gone undecided by this Court, I have concluded to now vote with Justice Shepard. When in doubt, I am reminded that it was the leadership Justice Shepard displayed in his 80 percent unanimous opinion in Cheney v. Palos Verdes, 104 Idaho 897 , 665 P.2d 661 (1983), which put the shackles on the ill-starred 1972 companion cases of Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683 , 496 P.2d 682 (1972), and Jolley v. Puregro, 94 Idaho 702 , 496 P.2d 939 (1972).
. His ultimate conclusion in the final paragraph of his Ramsey opinion was that the controlling High Court case of Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 , 70 S.Ct. 398 , 94 L.Ed. 424 (1950) precluded an Idaho state district court from dealing with the husband's United States military pension. He added: "There are other ways to give financial security to the wife, such as a disproportionate distribution [in her favor] of the remaining community property, and alimony.” 96 Idaho at 684, 535 P.2d at 65.