holding that under standardized contract purchased from vending machine by airline passenger, passenger could reasonably have expected coverage for whole trip, including reasonable substituted transportation necessitated by emergency, and insurer should have plainly and clearly brought to passenger’s attention such limitation of liability if insurer did not propose such coverage
How later courts described this case
- holding that under standardized contract purchased from vending machine by airline passenger, passenger could reasonably have expected coverage for whole trip, including reasonable substituted transportation necessitated by emergency, and insurer should have plainly and clearly brought to passenger’s attention such limitation of liability if insurer did not propose such coverage
- refusing to enforce limitation on liability in insurance policy because insured "must purchase the policy before he even knows its provisions"
- the question of ambiguity of the policy language is to be determined in view of the insured’s “knowledge and understanding as a reasonable layman, his normal expectation of the extent of coverage of the policy ...”
- “We do not believe the maxim [of expressio unius] should serve to defeat the basic rule that the insurance contract should be interpreted against the draftsman.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow in part by First National Bank Of Chicago v. The Fidelity And Casualty Company Of New York, 428 F.2d 499 (1970)
We reject Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, 58 Cal.2d 862, 27 Cal.Rptr. 172, 377 P.2d 284 (1962), cited and relied on by the plaintiffs, in so far as it deems the reasonable expectation of the insured as controlling the policy's express terms.
Declined to follow in part by First National Bank v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 428 F.2d 499 (1970)
We reject Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, 58 Cal.2d 862, 27 Cal.Rptr. 172, 377 P.2d 284 (1962), cited and relied on by the plaintiffs, in so far as it deems the reasonable expectation of the insured as controlling the policy’s express terms.
The opinion
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.
In my opinion the policy covered travel by air only on scheduled air carriers. I find no basis for assuming that the ordinary traveler would reasonably believe that the policy covered travel on other than scheduled air carriers, and since there is no rule of law that requires defendant to cover risks it does not wish to cover, I would affirm the judgment.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied January 16, 1963. Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Me Comb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.