The opinion
BUTTLER, P. J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s disposition of the case, except for its holding that a mandatory suspension of a driver’s license is not a basic legal consequence of which the defendant must be advised in order to make a voluntary and informed guilty plea.
It seems to me that a defendant contemplating a I guilty plea, upon being advised by the court that the maximum penalties which might be imposed include one year in jail and a fine of up to $500, might accept the remote risk of a jail *192 term or the maximum fine, neither of which is a certainty. At the same time, if the defendant is told that his driver’s license will be suspended, he might not be willing to plead guilty. The certain loss of the right to operate an automobile for 90 days (ORS 482.430(2) and (4)), may well be a more significant factor in deciding to plead guilty than is the possible jail term or fine. The mandatory suspension is a sanction, even though, in addition to penalizing the defendant, it also protects the public. It is a more direct consequence of a guilty plea than a discretionary jail term or fine.
For those reasons, I would hold that a defendant who enters a guilty plea without being advised of the mandatory license suspension has not made a “voluntary and informed guilty plea.” 1 Accordingly, on remand, I would instruct the post-conviction court to determine whether petitioner was so advised.
The majority relies on Jones v. Cupp, 7 Or App 415 , 490 P2d 1038 (1971), for the proposition that only advice of “basic legal consequences” is required, and that “collateral matters which are civil in nature, such as loss of passport, deportation, loss of voting privileges, and undesirable discharge are too remote. * * *” 55 Or App at 190-191. Subsequent to that decision, ORS 135.385 was enacted, subsection (2)(d) of which negated at least that portion of the language relating to deportation. The viability of Jones is at least questionable.