refusing to extend the Pinter test to subsection (2) of the state statute and maintaining the "substantial factor test” to evaluate that section as previously adopted by the court
How later courts described this case
- refusing to extend the Pinter test to subsection (2) of the state statute and maintaining the "substantial factor test” to evaluate that section as previously adopted by the court
- reaffirming the substantial contributing factor test after the Supreme Court adopted a strict privity test for federal securities law in Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 100 L.Ed.2d 658 (1988)
- “N(Hoffer II”)(refus-ing to dismiss state auditor). The Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support the argument that the professional defendants were a substantial contributing factor in the sale of the securities. D. Reliance In order to state a cause of action under WSSA, a plaintiff must allege that he or she relied on the misrepresentations at issue. Hines, 114 Wash.2d at 134, 787 P.2d at 12. Where, as here, reliance is not expressly alleged in the complaint, reliance may nevertheless be presumed in several circumstances: 1
- it is well settled that the Supreme Court’s construction of a similarly worded federal statute, although often persuasive, does not control this court’s interpretation of a state statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Pearson, J.
(dissenting)—I dissent for the reasons given in my dissent in Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wn.2d 107, 179-90 , 744 P.2d 1032 , 750 P.2d 254 (1987). RCW 21.20-.430(1), by its plain language, requires privity of the seller and the person buying the security. My views are reinforced by Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 , 100 L. Ed. 2d 658 , 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988). As the majority acknowledges, Pinter now requires a strict privity analysis of the term "seller" under section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77Z(1).
The underpinnings of Haberman came from lower federal court decisions which are no longer authoritative in light of the Pinter ruling. It is an anomaly for the majority to adhere to a "substantial contributive factor" analysis which has now been discredited by the United States Supreme Court.
I also disagree that a negligent misrepresentation claim survives summary judgment. My reasons are contained in my dissent in Haberman v. WPPSS, supra.
Andersen, J., concurs with Pearson, J.