explaining, in the equal protection setting, that strict scrutiny entails consideration of whether a classification is “necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- explaining, in the equal protection setting, that strict scrutiny entails consideration of whether a classification is “necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest” (emphasis added)
- holding strict scrutiny was inapplicable to challenge to mandatory minimum sentencing statute for conviction of certain felonies committed while possessing firearm because fundamental liberty interest was not at stake
- holding that application of a mandatory minimum sentencing provision does not implicate a fundamental right
- upholding the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentencing applicable to convictions of certain felonies, where the statute clearly related to the legislature’s objective of deterring violent crime
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Shawver, 2011 Pa. Super. 57 (2011)
Bell, supra at 345-46, 516 A.2d at 1178-79 (holding strict scrutiny was inapplicable to challenge to mandatory minimum sentencing statute for conviction of certain felonies committed while possessing firearm because fundamental liberty interest was not at stake);
The opinion
HUTCHINSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I have no quarrel with the majority’s holding that Section 9712 of the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712, applies generally to the crime of voluntary manslaughter and specifically to the type of voluntary manslaughter defined in Section 2503(a) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. 2503(a). On the constitutional issue, I would simply affirm on the basis of Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25 , 494 A.2d 354 , aff'd. sub. nom. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1985).
In addition, for the reasons set forth in my concurring opinion in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Parker White Metal Co., 512 Pa. 74 , 515 A.2d 1358 (1986), I wish to note my belief that the dictum discussing a three-tiered equal protection analysis is neither necessary nor appropriate.