finding that the parents of a hemophiliac child who had filed a wrongful birth claim against doctors who had provided prenatal genetic counseling and misinformed the prospective mother that she had a “very low” risk being a genetic carrier of hemophilia, had a cause of action for extraordinary expenses that they would incur in caring for their hemophiliac child during his minority
How later courts described this case
- finding that the parents of a hemophiliac child who had filed a wrongful birth claim against doctors who had provided prenatal genetic counseling and misinformed the prospective mother that she had a “very low” risk being a genetic carrier of hemophilia, had a cause of action for extraordinary expenses that they would incur in caring for their hemophiliac child during his minority
- rejecting a hemophiliac child’s wrongful life claim, in which he sought to recover extraordinary expenses, because “the public policy of this State to protect and to preserve the sanctity of all human life *** militates against the judgment that an individual life is so wretched that one would have been better off not to exist”
- agreeing with the majority of courts "that an action for the wrongful birth of a genetically or congenitally defective child may be maintained by the parents of such child” (emphasis added)
- characterizing Renslow as an “ordinary prenatal-injury case” rather than a wrongful life action
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Clark v. Children's Memorial Hosp., 353 Ill. Dec. 254 (2011)
117 Ill. 2d 230, 246-48 , 512 N.E.2d 691 , 111 Ill. Dec. 302 (Ill. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Clark v. Child.’s Mem. Hosp., 2011 IL 108656 , ¶ 113, 955 N.E.2d 1065 , 353 Ill. Dec. 254
Overruled by Clark v. Children's Memorial Hospital, 2011 IL 108656 (2011)
2011 IL 108656, ¶¶ 102-03, 113 (overruling Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 117 Ill. 2d 230 (1987)).
The opinion
JUSTICE MILLER specially concurs as to Parts I and II and joins in Part III of the decision:
I concur in the decision of the court. As the main opinion demonstrates, the minor’s “wrongful life” action seeking special damages must fail because he cannot establish a legally cognizable injury. I agree with the decision that the minor’s parents here suffered a legally cognizable injury and therefore should be allowed to pursue their “wrongful birth” action to recover the extraordinary expenses associated with their child’s ailment, but that the parents’ separate claim for damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress is insufficient under Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 546 .
Because the parties’ contentions in this appeal are adequately answered under those principles of tort law, I do not believe that it is necessary, or even helpful, to introduce the abortion controversy into the proceedings here. I therefore see no reason to rely on the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 81 — 21 through 81 — 35) or to attempt to discover a “pro-life” character to any of the prior decisions of this court in deciding the issues here.
For these reasons, I do not join in that portion of the opinion that looks to the Abortion Law as a source of public policy in this case, nor do I join in attempting to categorize any of the prior decisions of this court as “pro-life” or “pro-choice.” An analysis of the opinion demonstrates that neither inquiry is necessary to a resolution of the issues presented here.