finding that the parents of a hemophiliac child who had filed a wrongful birth claim against doctors who had provided prenatal genetic counseling and misinformed the prospective mother that she had a “very low” risk being a genetic carrier of hemophilia, had a cause of action for extraordinary expenses that they would incur in caring for their hemophiliac child during his minority
How later courts described this case
- finding that the parents of a hemophiliac child who had filed a wrongful birth claim against doctors who had provided prenatal genetic counseling and misinformed the prospective mother that she had a “very low” risk being a genetic carrier of hemophilia, had a cause of action for extraordinary expenses that they would incur in caring for their hemophiliac child during his minority
- rejecting a hemophiliac child’s wrongful life claim, in which he sought to recover extraordinary expenses, because “the public policy of this State to protect and to preserve the sanctity of all human life *** militates against the judgment that an individual life is so wretched that one would have been better off not to exist”
- agreeing with the majority of courts "that an action for the wrongful birth of a genetically or congenitally defective child may be maintained by the parents of such child” (emphasis added)
- characterizing Renslow as an “ordinary prenatal-injury case” rather than a wrongful life action
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Clark v. Children's Memorial Hosp., 353 Ill. Dec. 254 (2011)
117 Ill. 2d 230, 246-48 , 512 N.E.2d 691 , 111 Ill. Dec. 302 (Ill. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Clark v. Child.’s Mem. Hosp., 2011 IL 108656 , ¶ 113, 955 N.E.2d 1065 , 353 Ill. Dec. 254
Overruled by Clark v. Children's Memorial Hospital, 2011 IL 108656 (2011)
2011 IL 108656, ¶¶ 102-03, 113 (overruling Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 117 Ill. 2d 230 (1987)).
The opinion
JUSTICE WARD concurs as to Parts I and III and dissents as to Part II of the decision:
Adam, who is now six years old, was born a hemophiliac. As the majority states, the complaint of his parents is that because of the defendants’ negligence in not correctly judging the chances of his being afflicted with hemophilia, Adam was born to them and not aborted, to his personal injury and to their financial and emotional injury. The majority follows the decisions in the majority of jurisdictions, including our own, and holds that Adam cannot recover on a wrongful life claim. The rationale in denying, as the majority recognizes, is that the core of the infant’s claim is that, though the negligence of the defendants prevented the mother from obtaining an abortion which would have terminated the child’s existence, human life, though burdened with injury, is as a matter of law always preferable to nonexistence. A second basis for rejecting the claim for wrongful life is the difficulty or impossibility of determining damages. There is no station from which one can compare the condition of life with handicaps, with a state of nonexistence. Who can judge that no life at all is better than a life that is impaired.
Having rejected the claim of Adam for “wrongful life,” the majority then proceeds inconsistently, I consider, and expediently to hold that the parents have a cause of action for “wrongful birth.” The majority accepts the allegation of Mrs. Siemieniec that had she been accurately advised of the risk that her conceived child would be born a hemophiliac, she then would have terminated the pregnancy by abortion. The parents contend that they were tortiously injured because Mrs. Siemieniec was deprived of the option of making an informed decision either to abort the existing fetus or to give birth to what was potentially a genetically defective child. The majority states that “in essence, they [the parents] claim that Adam’s birth was wrongful” — that it would have been better for them had Adam never been born. In terms of seeking recovery in tort, Adam’s being bom was the resulting injury. I agree with the defendants’ contention that the claim for a cause of action for wrongful birth is postulated on the assumption that life itself is an injury. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in rejecting a claim of parents for wrongful birth, correctly observed that in order to allow recovery for wrongful birth a court must hold “that the existence of a human life can constitute an injury cognizable at law.” Azzolino v. Dingfelder (1985), 315 N.C. 103 , 337 S.E.2d 528, 533-34 .
In the parents’ claim of a cause of action, as in Adam’s claim, we are weighing life against nonlife. The parents, too, say in effect that nonlife would have been a value and that life is an injury. I see only expediency to explain the holding for the parents.
In Cockrum v. Baumgartner (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 193 , this court considered claims of medical negligence based on “wrongful pregnancy” and held that the costs of rearing a normal child cannot be considered damages to the parents. I wrote for the court in that case and believe that the defendants may correctly cite it for the principle that holding that the birth of a child is a compensable injury offends fundamental values our civilization and culture attach to human life. What this court said in Cockrum earlier applies to today’s holding of the majority that Adam’s being born gave rise to a right of the parents to recover damages:
“One can, of course, in mechanical logic reach a different conclusion, but only on the ground that human life and the state of parenthood are compensable losses. In a proper hierarchy of values the benefit of life should not be outweighed by the expense of supporting it. Respect for life and the rights proceeding from it are at the heart of our legal system and, broader still, our civilization.” 95 Ill. 2d 193, 200-01 .
One cannot pass over how painful to parents and child alike an action by parents must be. Parents will show that they did not want the child in his condition and that he would have been aborted had it not been for the professional inattentiveness of a physician or other medical person. Had they known, he never would have been. It is public policy obviously to encourage love and harmony in family relationships. Public policy which in importance transcends individual disputes will hardly be served by lawsuits of this character.
Circumstances in cases like these are tragic, but for the reasons given I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding in Part II that the parents can recover for wrongful birth. I concur, however, in the disposition by the majority in Parts I and III.