stating, “in interpreting the due process clause of the state constitution, we have repeatedly noted that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment does not control our interpretation of the state constitution’s due process clause”
How later courts described this case
- stating, “in interpreting the due process clause of the state constitution, we have repeatedly noted that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment does not control our interpretation of the state constitution’s due process clause”
- relying on Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), so that any federal constitutional decision by the Supreme Court "will have no bearing on our decision"
- reaffirming holding of prior decision at 98 Wash.2d 173, 654 P.2d 1170 regarding unadjudicat-ed criminal conduct after Supreme Court vacated prior decision
- Bartholomew ID; State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 890, 822 P.2d 177 (1991), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992). ER 609 cmt., 1994 Washington Rules of Court, at 213. See, e.g., State v. Ray, 116 Wn.2d 531, 545, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by Charles R. Campbell v. Larry Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453 (1987)
We disagree with Campbell’s characterization of Bartholomew.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Hinton v. State, 548 So. 2d 547 (1988)
Moreover, Bartholomew is factually distinguishable from the case at bar.
The opinion
Rosellini, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part)— While the majority's decision to limit the prosecution to evidence of statutory aggravating factors may be justified in the initial stages of a sentencing proceeding, the jury's need to evaluate the validity of defendant's mitigation evidence requires more liberal standards, once defendant has placed an aspect of his character in issue. Because the majority's rule unfairly restricts the State's right to introduce relevant, reliable rebuttal evidence, I dissent.
My disagreement with the majority lies with its insistence that the rules of evidence must be applied strictly, in the sentencing proceeding, to all evidence introduced by the State, while at the same time allowing defendant an unlimited right to introduce mitigating evidence. I believe this rule unnecessarily and improperly narrows the information available to the jury to that presented by defendant. With only one side before it, the jury cannot rationally resolve the question the statute requires it to address. RCW 10.95-.060(4) states that the jury shall answer the following question:
"Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?"
Both the truth-seeking process and basic principles of fairness dictate that the jury be exposed to all relevant *649 reliable evidence in deciding whether to impose the death sentence.
The law should be impartial in its application. Neither the State nor the defendant should have any advantage in presenting evidence. If the evidence is relevant, reliable rebuttal evidence, it should be permitted. By denying the admissibility of reliable evidence, the majority sanctions a situation where the jury is effectively denied information vital to its decision to discharge its duty. This result is unfair to all involved; the State, the jury, the public and those defendants who commit similar acts but receive the death sentence because their crimes resulted in convictions.
Moreover, the majority's position clearly conflicts with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court, which encourages liberal admission of evidence. That Court has stated:
We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered at such a hearing and to approve open and far-ranging argument. ... So long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions. We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision.
(Italics mine.) Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 , 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976). See Zant v. Stephens,_ U.S.__, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 , 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2748 (1983) and California v. Ramos,_U.S._, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1171 , 103 S. Ct. 3446 , 3457 n.23 (1983).
Finally, the majority's reliance on independent state grounds is misplaced. Due process requires that the jury's decision be based on reliable information. By going beyond this standard and applying arbitrary rules which deny the jury the complete facts, the majority's opinion undermines the very foundations of due process analysis. I therefore dissent from that portion of the opinion that restricts the State's use of evidence in uncharged crimes in rebuttal.