recognizing that "[e]vidence which is `substantial' to support a preponderance may not be sufficient to support the clear, cogent, and convincing" standard
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that "[e]vidence which is `substantial' to support a preponderance may not be sufficient to support the clear, cogent, and convincing" standard
- stating that “[e]vidence which is ‘substantial’ to support a preponderance may not be sufficient to support the clear, cogent, and convincing” standard
- discussion of prospect of will contest could not reasonably be construed as admission of legal trickery or a dishonest transaction
- addressing "the legal question of undue influence"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Sharp, J.
(dissenting) — In view of the length of the majority opinion (which in turn necessitated an unduly lengthy dissent), an observation on the scope of Supreme Court review in will contests seems appropriate. At one time will contests were tried de novo by this court. Fortunately, the rules have been changed, and now our function is to ascertain whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. In re Estate of Kleinlein, 59 Wn.2d 111 , 366 P.2d 186 (1961). As Justice Weaver stated in the will contest In re Estate of Dand, 41 Wn.2d 158 , 247 P.2d 1016 (1952):
This case is a striking example of the wisdom of our rule that the trial court, having the witnesses before it, is in a better position to arrive at the truth than is the appellate court.
My examination of the record discloses substantial evidence to support the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court. For that reason I would affirm.
July 9, 1971. Petition for rehearing denied.