“A distinction based on motor vehicle versus non-motor vehicle accidents . . . has no rational justification”
How later courts described this case
- “A distinction based on motor vehicle versus non-motor vehicle accidents . . . has no rational justification”
- “no absolute curtain of immunity protects a parent who negligently causes injury to his or her minor child”
- where child was injured while at parent’s place of business, family immunity doctrine will not protect parent because the prior distinction between motor vehicle and non-motor vehicle negligence has no rational justification
- “no absolute *682 curtain of immunity protects a parent who negligently causes injury to his or her minor child”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*766 Hennessey, C.J.
(concurring). I agree with the result reached by Justices Wilkins, Liacos, and Abrams. I also agree with their reasoning in all but one respect, as follows. The opinion lists and briefly describes several cases in which we have rejected the status of a party to the tort (e.g., a spouse, a charity, a government entity) as a controlling element in determining liability for negligence. Also listed is Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244 (1982), in which a majority of this court concluded that an adult trespasser, not known to be in peril, was barred from recovering in a negligence claim against the landowner. The implication is that the result in Schofield is inconsistent (it is cited as “contra”) with the “status” cases. Not so. I suppose that in a dictionary sense we are indicating a status when we speak of a trespasser. More significantly, we are referring to conduct. “Trespasser” is a label for a person who has unlawfully entered the land of another. I joined a majority of this court in Schofield in determining that such a wrongdoer, whether burglar or mere interloper, can prevail only upon a showing of wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct of the defendant landowner. I suggest that the Schofield result is sound policy, and also is consistent with the reasoning that the status of a party should not be a controlling element in determining liability for negligence.