concluding that execution of section 1738(d) waiver does demonstrate knowing waiver of inter-policy stacking in single-vehicle policy because, inter alia, it could not refer to intra-policy stacking because it only applies to multiple vehicle policies
How later courts described this case
- concluding that execution of section 1738(d) waiver does demonstrate knowing waiver of inter-policy stacking in single-vehicle policy because, inter alia, it could not refer to intra-policy stacking because it only applies to multiple vehicle policies
- explaining that “the language of subsection (d) . . . does not clearly address an inter-policy stacking waiver, which would involve the limits for each motor vehicle insured under the policies” (citing 75 Pa. C.S. § 1738(d))
- stating, “[a]bsent the applicability of intra-policy waiver, the only interpretation fairly available to [the policyholder] was that his premium-reducing waiver applied to - 14 - J-A22002-22 inter-policy stacking”
- acknowledging that household exclusions have been upheld as congruent with the public policy of containing insurance costs for insureds and preventing insurers from being held responsible for unforeseeable coverage
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN,
concurring.
I join Chief Justice Cappy’s interpretation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738, as I believe subsection (b) provides a named insured the option of waiving both inter- and intra-policy stacking of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, and that option is not undone by subsections (c) and (d), even though the language of those subsections seems to speak to the intrapolicy situation alone.
I write separately to address the household vehicle exclusion in Randall’s policy, see Majority Op., 586 Pa. at 488-92, 895 A.2d at 533-34, which State Farm argues is valid and enforceable. While the majority does not reach a discussion of this clause, I believe the clause also precludes the Craleys’ recovery of uninsured motorist benefits under Randall’s poli *508 cy. This clause is similar to household vehicle exclusion clauses this Court previously has held enforceable. See Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82 , 813 A.2d 747, 755 (2002) (household exclusion consistent with public policy of MVFRL); Eichelman v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 551 Pa. 558 , 711 A.2d 1006, 1010 (1998) (household exclusion enforceable as it furthers legislative policy behind underinsured motorist coverage in MVFRL and furthers MVFRL’s intent of stopping spiralling costs of automobile insurance). There is no reason, public policy or otherwise, to not enforce this exclusion.
For the reasons offered above, I concur.