The opinion
On Rehearing.
FOSTER, Justice.
We do not understand that appellant in his argument on application for rehearing controverts the statement in our opinion that the bill alleges facts iwhich show the union appellant was engaged in an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, section 8(b), (4), (A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (b), (4), (A). It was not otherwise contended in oral argument on the submission. Appellant now observes that the several recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court cited in brief were not before us when our opinion was written. National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 , 71 S.Ct. 943 , 95 L.Ed. 1284 ; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National Labor Relations Board, 341 U.S. 694 , 71 S.Ct. 954 , 95 L.Ed. 1299 ; National Labor Relations Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 , 71 S.Ct. 961 , 95 L.Ed. 1277 ; Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., A. F. of L. v. National Labor Relations Board, 341 U.S. 707 , 71 S.Ct. 966 , 95 L.Ed. 1309 .
Those cases were decided a few days before this case. They or one of them was called to our attention. They support the theory, not controverted in this case, that the bill shows an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act, supra. They also show that in order to redress that wrong a complaint was filed with the board. In some of the cases the board had a hearing and made a cease and desist order. The proceedings were to review and enforce those orders. They were upheld. The principal question controverted and settled was whether there was an unfair labor practice by the union under section 8(b), (4), (A).
In one of the cases National Labor Relations Board v. International Rice Milling Co., supra, the board dismissed the complaint because it was not such an unfair labor practice. The court sustained that ruling. It is not contended that this last case is here controlling because it applies to a different situation. In the other cases the board took jurisdiction and made a final cease and desist order. It does not appear that a preliminary injunction had been issued (as provided in section 10[1]). But the proceeding was before the Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the board’s order as provided in section 10(e). Section 160 of Title 29 U.S.C.A.
Those three latter cases only show that a remedy before the board was applied to make a final order of cease and desist. There was of course nothing new nor controversial about that.
The only question we have in this case is whether the State court has jurisdiction when special circumstances of irreparable injury are alleged and not controverted, *690 augmented by the necessary' time of the board in making the preliminary investigation, and subject to a possibility that that board will’ not take jurisdiction on account of the small amount of influence the transaction has on the flow of interstate commerce. This being in the discretion of the board, it was not necessary for complainant to take that risk in a situation which was then holding up construction and causing irreparable damage. National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, supra (4), 341 U.S. 675 , 71 S.Ct. at pages 949, 950, 71 L.Ed. 1284 .See, also, for current practice in that respect, “Release of National Labor Relations Board, dated October 6, 1950,” under which the board will exercise jurisdiction when any enterprise has a direct inflow of material valued at $500,000 a year, or an indirect inflow of material valued at $1,000,000 a year.
Considering that release and the urgency of the need for an immediate injunction to prevent irreparable damage, we still think a state court of equity was open to com-, plainant. No other court had jurisdiction. The only other remedy was before the board. We think the authorities support the view that a state court of equity has jurisdiction upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances or irreparable injury.
The application for rehearing is over-, ruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and BROWN, LAWSON, SIMPSON and STAKELY, JJ-, concur.