holding that California’s adoption scheme violates due-process rights of unwed fathers by allowing “a mother unilaterally to preclude her child’s biological father from becoming a ‘presumed father and thereby allowing the state to terminate his parental fights on nothing more than a showing of the child’s *781 best interest”
How later courts described this case
- holding that California’s adoption scheme violates due-process rights of unwed fathers by allowing “a mother unilaterally to preclude her child’s biological father from becoming a ‘presumed father and thereby allowing the state to terminate his parental fights on nothing more than a showing of the child’s *781 best interest”
- holding that “[i]f an unwed father promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities—emotional, financial, and otherwise—his federal constitutional right to due process prohibits the termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent”
- holding unconstitutional statutory scheme whereby unwed biological mother could prevent unwed biological father from attaining status of presumed father, whose consent is required for adoption of nonmarital child
- stating “we must not read too much into Michael H.,” and relying on that ease for the proposition that five justices recognized unwed father’s liberty interest
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I bconcur in the result only. My concern for the welfare of the child in cases of this sort prevents me from joining the majority’s reasoning.
The majority declare that Civil Code section 7004, a provision of the Uniform Parentage Act enacted in 1975, is unconstitutional as applied. The soundness of their determination is open to serious question. Its potential for mischief is not. It creates needless uncertainty in the application of statutory categories that have been consistently employed for almost 20 years. Such uncertainty will redound to the disadvantage of all parties—but especially the child.
The majority yield to the lamentable temptation to invoke the Constitution when there is a perfectly simple legal solution to the factual problem of this case. It is settled law that we should not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required. (People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 888 , 547 P.2d 1000 ].) The majority invoke the equal protection clause as a first resort rather than a last, without considering how trifling with a statute that has been used without challenge for nearly two decades may affect countless parents and children.
*853 I can understand the motive of the majority: to attempt a just result under the purported factual circumstances of this case. That does not justify, however, in effect throwing out the innocent baby with the statutory bath water. There is a much cleaner solution.
Though the facts are disputed, assume, arguendo, that in this case they can be established at trial. The biological father engaged in an adulterous relationship with the mother. A child was born. Though he had rejected the mother and returned to his wife, the biological father conceded paternity, made reasonable efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the" child and indicated a willingness to take the child into his home and to support it. In short, the biological father allegedly sought to become a presumed father within the statutory requirements of Civil Code section 7004, subdivision (a)(4), but was thwarted from achieving that status through the purported devious actions of the mother.
Under those circumstances, if established by a preponderance of evidence in court, I would estop the mother and the proposed adoptive parents from denying that the biological father had assumed the status of a presumed father. These are paradigm circumstances for the imposition of an estoppel. As Witkin observes, an estoppel deprives a defendant of her defense because of her own objectionable conduct. (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Actions, § 523, p. 550.) Evidence Code section 623 also refers to estoppel by conduct.
Generally speaking, equitable estoppel is a rule of fundamental fairness by which a party is precluded from benefiting from conduct designed to prevent determination of the truth and a resolution based thereon. While often applied in commercial transactions, equitable estoppel has also been invoked in domestic relations cases. (See, e.g., Clevenger v. Clevenger (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 662 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 90 A.L.R.2d 569 ] [declaring that “under some circumstances the husband would be estopped to assert the illegitimacy of the child and thereby avoid liability for its support”] (per Tobriner, J.); In re Marriage of Valle (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 837, 842 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 38 ] [to similar effect]; In re Marriage of Johnson (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 848, 852 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 121 ] [same]; Guardianship of Szwed (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1403, 1415 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 121 ] [mother’s husband estopped from relying on statutory presumption of paternity when he had previously admitted he was not the biological father].)
To my mind, the choice between a declaration of unconstitutionality and a use of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is clear. The latter will yield justice for the party if he deserves justice in this individual action without providing *854 a precedent that has the potential to produce unfortunate results in countless other proceedings, even those previously concluded.
The leading United States Supreme Court case of Lehr v. Robertson (1983) 463 U.S. 248 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 614 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 ], makes it abundantly clear that the issue is purely and simply factual. Said the court, at page 262 [ 77 L.Ed.2d at page 627 ]: “The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for his child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interests lie.”
Accordingly, I would remand the cause to the trial court for factual proceedings consistent with this opinion.