a branch violates the separation of power when “the activity of one branch threatens the independence or integrity or invades the prerogatives of another”
How later courts described this case
- a branch violates the separation of power when “the activity of one branch threatens the independence or integrity or invades the prerogatives of another”
- “a legislatively created bargaining scheme does not and cannot interfere with the ultimate power of the judiciary to administer its own affairs. Until and unless such a scheme interferes with the court’s functioning, no separation-of-powers problem exists.”
- commenting on court's refusal to interfere with the executive branch of the government on the principle of separation of powers
- “failure to exhaust remedies under the bargaining act . . . does not bar [plaintiffs’] access to the courts. . . . [R]emedies prescribed by [bargaining act or contract] would have been futile where the controversy centers on the applicability of the act[.]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 127 Ill. 2d 453 (1989)
We are aware that the Washington Supreme Court has reached a different conclusion on a similar question (Zylstra v. Piva (1975), 85 Wash. 2d 743, 539 P.2d 823), but we decline to follow its reasoning.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Spokane County v. State, 136 Wash. 2d 644 (1998)
It has been asserted that Zylstra is inapplicable because the Administrative Procedure Act was not then in existence.
The opinion
Finley, J.
(concurring) — In the field of criminal law some form of probation, (a) deferral of sentence, or (b) the imposition and suspension of sentence, and (c) the release of a criminal defendant under prescribed conditions subject to some kind of supervision probably has existed for a long time — usually as an adjunct of the courts or the judicial branch of government. Probation in a very modern sense has, of course, become a recognized procedure in modern criminal law administration. Usually it has been an adjunct of the courts or the judicial branch. In any event, however, I see no reason to characterize probation absolutely as an inherent or otherwise inevitable adjunct or function of the courts or the judicial branch of government. Modern prison administration is certainly not regarded in any absolute sense as a part of the court system and the judicial branch of government. I can see no really fundamental stresses or strains, or prohibitions based on the so-called separation of powers doctrine, if the legislature should provide that probation would be granted, supervised, and administered not by the courts but by an independent agency of government or by possibly the State Parole Board. Based upon this thesis I see no problems as to the present juvenile probation system established by the state legislature. In other words, as pointed out in the majority opinion by Hamilton, J., RCW 13.04.040 provides that compensation for juvenile court probation counselors and detention staff is to be fixed and paid by the county. Also, as stated in the majority opinion, such offices have been held to be county offices. In re Lewis, 51 Wn.2d 193 , 316 P.2d 907 (1957). Furthermore, as pointed out in the majority opinion, RCW 13.04.040 provides that juvenile court *752 employees are to be hired, controlled, and discharged by the judges of the court. From the foregoing, it follows, as emphasized by the majority, that probation officers or counselors and other personnel have a dual status. As to wages and other benefits they are employees of the county and the collective bargaining act is applicable. As to hiring, firing, working conditions and related matters, they are employees of the juvenile court and of the state’s judicial branch of government, and the act is not applicable.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the majority opinion.
Wright, J., concurs with Finley, J.