holding that double-jeopardy principles did not bar retrial of greater offense on which jury expressly deadlocked, where jury returned conviction on lesser charge; but statute barred retrial
How later courts described this case
- holding that double-jeopardy principles did not bar retrial of greater offense on which jury expressly deadlocked, where jury returned conviction on lesser charge; but statute barred retrial
- holding that conviction of a lesser included offense was not an implied acquittal of the greater offense on which the jury expressly deadlocked
- decided wholly on state statutory, rather than federal constitutional, grounds
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Porter v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 240 (2007)
In People v. Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th 289, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832, as in this case, the doctrine of implied acquittal was inapplicable to the greater offense.
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I concur in the judgment. I also generally concur in the opinion prepared for the court by former Chief Justice Lucas. I write separately only to make the following observation. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784, 793-796 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 715-717 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 ]), “protects” a defendant “against a second prosecution for the same offense” “after conviction” as well as “after acquittal.” (North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 717 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-665 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 ].) For present purposes, the “same offense” encompasses the greater including offense and the lesser included offense. (Brown v. Ohio (1977) 432 U.S. 161, 164-169 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 187, 193-196 , 97 S.Ct. 2221 ].) Hence, the double jeopardy clause protects defendant against a second prosecution for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, the greater including offense, after conviction for vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, the lesser included offense.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied June 12, 1996, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.