“A state may, consistent with due process, dispense with the preliminary hearing procedure and authorize the prosecutor to initiate the criminal proceedings directly.”
How later courts described this case
- “A state may, consistent with due process, dispense with the preliminary hearing procedure and authorize the prosecutor to initiate the criminal proceedings directly.”
- “If a defendant is initially charged by criminal complaint, but is indicted for the same crime prior to a prompt preliminary hearing on the complaint, he is not constitutionally entitled to a preliminary hearing.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. JUSTICE JOHNSON, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion affirming the sentence. The sentence handed down in this case constitutes a departure from the fundamental law, its spirit, and purpose. (People v. Taylor (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 417 , 211 N.E.2d 673 ; People v. Ramey (1969), 115 Ill. App. 2d 431 , 253 N.E.2d 688 ; People v. Juve (1969), 106 Ill. App. 2d 421 , 245 N.E.2d 293 .) A sentence of 200 to 600 years is potentially a mockery to the spirit and purpose of the law and should be seen as abusive of the discretion vested in the trial court to render sentence. Our laws are based on. fact and reason, yet a sentence of the length issued by the trial court is based upon fiction. The fiction is that such a great number of years is required to assure the permanent detention of the offender.
The majority opinion cites People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149 , 368 N.E.2d 882 , in finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Our reading of Perruquet reveals Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (4) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 615(b)(4)) grants reviewing courts the power to reduce the sentence by the trial court. The rule itself does not address the scope of this power or the circumstances under which it should be exercised. Decisions by this court have established that the imposition of a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion and that, absent an abuse of this discretion, the sentence of the trial court may not be reduced upon review. Perruquet, at 153.
I choose to dissent because of the apparent evolution of Illinois law limiting the scope of sentencing power. (People v. Choate (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 267 , 389 N.E.2d 670 .) That evolution indicates that we should closely examine the criteria that we use to measure the scope of sentencing power. It is not enough to say that the court exercised its discretion and overlook a sentence that is so patently unrealistic as to assign a term of several hundreds of years. We must qualify any such sentence as beyond reason and obviously abusive of judicial discretion.
Further, though mere disparity between the sentence discussed during plea bargaining and the ultimate sentence imposed does not mandate reduction of the term when appealed to this court, henceforth it should serve as a signal for this court to closely examine the rendered sentence. Such a disparity coupled with the assessment of a term of hundreds of years should alert this court to exercise its power under Supreme Court Rule 615 and the applicable sentencing laws.
I would reduce the sentence rendered by the trial court and affirm the conviction.