agreeing with the appellant that “requiring proof of a local public need” as a condition of issuing a certificate in good standing “would conflict with the commerce clause”
How later courts described this case
- agreeing with the appellant that “requiring proof of a local public need” as a condition of issuing a certificate in good standing “would conflict with the commerce clause”
- listing cases that stand for this proposition
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring:
After considering the Lakehead’s petition for rehearing, I believe I must write separately to address what appears to be its fundamental argument in its petition for rehearing. Lakehead maintains that this court has fundamentally misconstrued our supreme court’s definition of “prudential control” in Service Pipe Line Co. v. Ruder, 19 Ill. 2d 322 (1960), which Lakehead argues clearly prohibits the Commission from denying eminent domain power to interstate carriers based upon the Commission’s assessment of public need, if that assessment considers any factors other than a need for the service by an entity other than the one proposing to construct or condemn.
Lakehead maintains that under Ruder the Commission has no authority to treat interstate common carriers by pipeline as if they are traditional Illinois utilities and has no power to evaluate overall conditions in interstate transportation markets when assessing public need for a proposed pipeline. Lakehead also maintains that Ruder is “clear” in holding that the Commission cannot deny eminent domain certification to an interstate carrier engaged in interstate commerce nor assess whether public convenience or need require the proposed additional service. To do so, Lakehead maintains under Ruder, would amount to an impermissible state interference in interstate commerce
If the Ruder decision in fact held as Lakehead maintains, I would be convinced that its position in the instant matter is correct. If we had misread or misapprehended Ruder, I would accept Lakehead’s admonition and grant its petition for rehearing. As it is, I have searched the Ruder decision high and low and simply cannot find the holdings that Lakehead believes are clear in that decision. Ruder did not place any limits upon the Commission’s methodology or authority to consider an interstate pipeline carrier’s application for the use of the state’s power of eminent domain. In fact, as the majority points out, the Ruder court recognized that the very issues that Lakehead brings before this court would someday be ripe for decision. The Ruder court observed only that a constitutional conflict may “lurk behind” the Commission’s exercise of prudential control over interstate utility projects for which the power of eminent domain is to be employed. Ruder, 19 Ill. 2d at 333-34 .
As I believe that Ruder does not support Lakehead’s contentions in its petition for rehearing, I concur in the decision as modified upon denial of the petition for rehearing.