holding that “[i]t is settled that a trial court should not instruct the jury on legal principles which have no application to the facts presented at trial. Rather, there must be some relationship between the evidence presented and the law upon which an instruction is requested.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[i]t is settled that a trial court should not instruct the jury on legal principles which have no application to the facts presented at trial. Rather, there must be some relationship between the evidence presented and the law upon which an instruction is requested.”
- holding that "[t]he fact that [the defendant's] defense expert testified that [the defendant] was psychotic and suffered from varying degrees of mental illness does not ineluctably suggest that he lacked the capacity to form a specific intent to kill"
- following Mitchell and noting that "the parties' arguments are [] deficient, as both are focused solely on the issue of whether appellant satisfied the `definition' of mental retardation, apparently proceeding upon the assumption that the criterion plucked from the definitions cited in the Atkins opinion are controlling as to that question"
- explaining that a successful diminished capacity defense can reduce a murder conviction from first to third degree
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Chief Justice CAPPY,
concurring.
I join the result of the majority opinion. Furthermore, I join the analysis that Justice Castille sets forth except for that part of the opinion addressing the admissibility of Dr. Weiner’s expert testimony. I agree with the majority’s statement *207 of the well-settled principle that the admissibility of evidence, including the admission of rebuttal evidence, is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Majority opinion at 929; Commonwealth v. Weiss, 565 Pa. 504 , 776 A.2d 958, 967 (2001). I distance myself, however, from the remainder of the majority’s analysis of this issue.
As mapped out by the majority opinion, this issue arose because during the pre-trial phase the Commonwealth contended, both before the trial court and on appeal, that Appellant should be precluded from offering any evidence of mental infirmity, including the presentation of the insanity defense, because Appellant impeded the interview process with Dr. Weiner. Due to this pre-trial argument, Appellant extrapolates that Dr. Weiner did not have a sufficient basis for his expert testimony and, thus, argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this testimony at the penalty phase. In essence, Appellant is attacking the sufficiency of the foundation for Dr. Weiner’s expert testimony.
The majority opinion disposes of Appellant’s argument regarding the admissibility of Weiner’s testimony, attributing any such deficiency in Dr. Weiner’s testimony as a result of Appellant’s “non-cooperation” or “recalcitrance.” Majority opinion at 929. The majority apparently adopts the Commonwealth’s position that Appellant impeded the interview process concluding that Appellant cannot challenge the admissibility of the evidence. I cannot agree with this reasoning because it contradicts the trial court’s order finding that Appellant “substantially complied” with the interview process. Indeed, the majority uses the trial court’s order to refute Appellant’s argument that Dr. Weiner had an insufficient basis for his testimony. The majority cannot have it both ways.
I also am not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because they do not accurately reflect what occurred during the pretrial litigation of this matter. Contrary to Appellant’s implications, the Commonwealth did not represent that Dr. Weiner could not testify regarding Appellant’s mental state because of the lack of face-to-face interview time, but asserted that Appellant should be precluded from offering any evidence of *208 mental infirmity because he did not cooperate with the interview process. Thus, the parties are talking apples and oranges, and I would not adopt either party’s analysis of this issue.
Rather, I join the result of the majority opinion on this issue simply because the Commonwealth laid an adequate foundation for Dr. Weiner’s rebuttal testimony at the penalty phase. Specifically, Dr. Weiner testified before the trial court, without the jury present that he had reviewed “[a]t least 211” sources of information in preparing his report for the penalty phase, N.T., 11/10/2001, at 1074; and that these sources of information included police reports, interviews with medical personnel, and reports from medical personnel, id. at 1081, 1084-85. Furthermore, he stated that he- could render an opinion without the aid of the interviews with Appellant. Id. at 1074-75. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony and the weight to be accorded such testimony was for the jury.
Messrs. Justice NIGRO and SAYLOR joins this concurring opinion.