holding that a perpetrator who communicated to his attorney a threat to “blow away” a judge was guilty of violating the “Intimidating a Judge” statute, notwithstanding the perpetrator’s belief that the judge would never learn of his threat, because the “Intimidating a Judge” statute, RCW 9A.72.160(1), does not include a requirement “that a threat... be made with the intent or knowledge that it will reach the judge”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a perpetrator who communicated to his attorney a threat to “blow away” a judge was guilty of violating the “Intimidating a Judge” statute, notwithstanding the perpetrator’s belief that the judge would never learn of his threat, because the “Intimidating a Judge” statute, RCW 9A.72.160(1), does not include a requirement “that a threat... be made with the intent or knowledge that it will reach the judge”
- affirming conviction for intimidating judge where the defendant told attorney he was attempting to retain that he was going to “ ‘get a gun and blow them all away, the prosecutor, the judge and the public defender’”
- in a phone call with an attorney whom Hansen consulted about representing him in a civil suit, Hansen made the threat “to get a gun and blow . . . away” the judge [in Hansen’s felony case], the prosecutor, and the public defender; the court explained that even “[i]f an attorney-client relationship could have been found to exist” at the time the threat was made, “the privilege would still not apply” because “[t]he attorney-client privilege is not applicable to . . . conversations regarding the [client’s] contemplation of a future crime”
- no attorney-client relationship where total contact consisted of only one phone call where attorney said he would not take the case
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Andersen, C.J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur in part I of the dissenting opinion. However, like the Court of Appeals, I conclude that the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient for the trier of fact to determine, as it *723 did, that the defendant intended or knew his threat would be communicated to Judge Dixon; for this reason, I concur with the majority's affirmance of the conviction.