holding that because Section 34-84 of school code referred only to "teachers and principals" and plaintiff was transferred from assistant principal position to teacher position, plaintiff did not have tenure in assistant principal position for which he was not certified
How later courts described this case
- holding that because Section 34-84 of school code referred only to "teachers and principals" and plaintiff was transferred from assistant principal position to teacher position, plaintiff did not have tenure in assistant principal position for which he was not certified
- noting that, although article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 12) provides that “[e]very person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs,” the court is not required to create a cause of action where none exists
- stating that “the teacher tenure provisions of the School Code are in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed in favor of the school district”
- article I, section 12, has been construed as an expression of philosophy and does not mandate the creation of an action and remedy where one did not formerly exist
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE MURRAY, dissenting:
The majority may be correct that the Illinois School Code affords no relief to an assistant principal who, despite over three years’ service, is unjustly removed from that position and assigned a less remunerative role. I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is not applicable to Bart’s cause.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985), 470 U.S. 532 , 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 , 105 S. Ct. 1487 , it was claimed that Loudermill, a board of education security guard, had no State property rights because he obtained his job by lying on his application. The United States Supreme Court held that the security guard may not have State property rights in his job, but he or she does have fourteenth amendment due process rights, saying:
"While the legislature may not elect to confer a property interest in [public employment], it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.” Arnett v. Kennedy (1974), 416 U.S. 134, 167 , 40 L. Ed. 2d 15, 40-41 , 94 S. Ct. 1633, 1650 (Powell, J., concurring).
I think Bart, as an assistant principal, has the same United States constitutional rights of due process as a Cleveland security guard. I would reverse and remand for a due process hearing on the serious charges of discriminatory conduct reflected in Bart’s complaint.