stating a judge may decline further inquiry if "defendant's request was solely a dilatory tactic"
How later courts described this case
- stating a judge may decline further inquiry if "defendant's request was solely a dilatory tactic"
- trial judge should make further inquiry where the defendant alleges that attorney is unprepared
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Brown, J.
(concurring). A person accused of a crime has an absolute right under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights as well as the Federal Constitution to a trial free from an atmosphere or circumstances tending to denigrate the seriousness of the process. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 536 (1956). Judicial proceedings must have “dignity, order, and decorum.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 343 (1970). It seems to me that this situation would have been much healthier if the defendant White’s several motions for a severance and for a mistrial had been allowed. Compare United States v. DiFronzo, 345 F. 2d 383, 385 (7th Cir.), cert. den. 382 U. S. 829 (1965). This, in my opinion, comes very close to reversible error. See Aratari v. Card- *570 well, 357 F. Supp. 681, 684 (S.D. Ohio 1973). But see United States v. Bentvena, 319 F. 2d 916, 930-931 (2d Cir.), cert. den. sub nom. Ormento v. United States, 375 U. S. 940 (1963) ; United States v. Marshall, 458 F. 2d 446, 451-452 (2d Cir. 1972).
In passing, it should be noted that the first Superior Court judge (the then Chief Justice) declared a mistrial during the selection of the jury because “the peremptory challenges of the district attorney [were] not well founded.” 1 See United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974). The assistant district attorney was at that time engaging in that much too often used practice of peremptorily challenging all potential black jurors when the defendant is black. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 223-224 (1965). The former Chief Justice’s exemplary action might well be kept in mind by all those engaged in the jury selection process. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 469 (D. Conn. 1976) (vacated on procedural grounds in United States v. Newman, 549 F. 2d 240 [2d Cir. 1977]), and cases cited. See generally Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 969-970 (1973). Compare Commonwealth v. Talbert, 357 Mass. 146, 147 (1970); Commonwealth v. Cranshaw, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 630, 631 (1976). This suggestion is equally applicable where the defendant is a member of any identifiable group or class.
See the majority opinion, supra at 563.