holding that the trial court’s exclusion of an eyewitness identification expert was an abuse of discretion where the ruling was "not predicated upon a balancing of conflicting factual contentions or equitable considerations” but based on the "legally incorrect" conclusion that "the jury would not be assisted by expert testimony because the subject embraced by that testimony could be elicited on cross-examination and argued without the evidentiary foundation”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the trial court’s exclusion of an eyewitness identification expert was an abuse of discretion where the ruling was "not predicated upon a balancing of conflicting factual contentions or equitable considerations” but based on the "legally incorrect" conclusion that "the jury would not be assisted by expert testimony because the subject embraced by that testimony could be elicited on cross-examination and argued without the evidentiary foundation”
- finding abuse of discretion in admission of photographs of “burned body, face and skull, the entry wound of the bullet, a close-up of the charred skull with a large bone flap cut away to show the red-colored, burned dura matter on the inside rim of the skull”
- stating that an abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision is “not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence”
- finding that under the facts of the case, trial court abused its discretion in excluding testimony as to the effect of discussions between witnesses on their identifications
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State of Arizona v. Trent Christopher Benson, 232 Ariz. 452 (2013)
660 P.2d 1208, 1219 (Ariz. 1983), overruled on different grounds by State v. Benson, 307 P.3d 19
Superseded by statute, as recognized in State of Arizona v. Trent Christopher Benson
135 Ariz. 281, 297, n.18 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 459, ¶ 154
Declined to follow by State v. McClendon, 248 Conn. 572 (1999)
In Chappie, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the trial court had abused its discretion when it excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification.4 We decline to follow Chapple and continue to follow the rationale of State v. Kemp, supra, 199 Conn. 473.5 We do not agree with the dissent that our decision in State v. Barletta, 238 Conn. 313, 312, 680 A.2d 1284 (1996), which involved the effects of cocaine use o…
The opinion
*300 HAYS, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I cannot agree with the majority’s position that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of an expert witness on eyewitness identification. With a view to preserving the integrity of the jury as finders of fact, I dissent in part.
It is the jury’s task to determine the weight and credibility of a witness’ testimony. What this court addresses is whether it is appropriate to have that determination put before the jury on the basis of expert witness testimony. Rule 704, Arizona Rules of Evidence, permits opinion testimony which embraces an ultimate issue if that testimony is otherwise admissible. However, rule 704 does not resolve all worry about invading the province of the jury. Testimony which is of such common knowledge that persons of ordinary education and background could reach as intelligent a conclusion as the expert shall be excluded. State v. Williams, 132 Ariz. 153 , 644 P.2d 889, 896 (1982).
Courts have consistently held that expert testimony relating to eyewitness identification constitutes an invasion of the jury’s province. 1 While I recognize the problems in eyewitness testimony, I am unable to distinguish the case at bench from the wealth of cases where identification is in issue.
Identification of a criminal defendant is always crucial, notwithstanding the number of issues in a case. The fact that identification was defendant Chappie’s sole defense should not compel us to carve out an exception to our rule against such testimony.
Our rules of evidence provide that a witness shall be impeached through cross-examination. “It is the responsibility of counsel during cross-examination to inquire into the witness’ opportunity for observation, his capacity for observation, his attention and interest and his distraction or division of attention.” United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.1973). A defense attorney can properly expose through cross-examination of the witness the time interval which passed between the occurrence of the event and the line-up and, through probing questions, the effects of stress and drugs on the witness’ perception. Allowing an expert to testify on the factors affecting the reliability of identification by an eyewitness is merely a guise for impeaching that witness. We cannot permit an expert to disparage the memory of a witness in order to impeach him. The ability of a person to make accurate observations is to be considered by the jury when assessing that witness’ credibility.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the average juror does not know that immediate identification is much more trustworthy than long-delayed identification. The average juror may not know the technical terms for this phenomenon, but that is not relevant to his ability to assess a witness’ credibility.
My concern here goes beyond the borders of this case. Once we have opened the door to this sort of impeaching testimony, what is to prevent experts from attacking any real or supposed deficiency in every other mental faculty? The peculiar risk of expert testimony with its scientific aura of trustworthiness and the possibility of undue prejudice should be respected. I have great reluctance to permit academia to take over the fact-finding function of the jury. Although clothed in other guise, that will be the practical effect. With little to distinguish this case from the general rule against admitting expert testimony on eyewitness identification, we are left with no guidelines to decide the deluge of similar issues which are sure to result.
I dissent in part.
. See n. 10 of majority opinion.