imposing common law negligence liability when minor ‘required’ to consume alcohol during college ‘hazing’ party
How later courts described this case
- imposing common law negligence liability when minor ‘required’ to consume alcohol during college ‘hazing’ party
- recognizing common law negligence liability where minor “required” to consume alcohol as part of fraternity “hazing” party
- holding a local fraternity chapter liable for hazing as a voluntary unincorporated association
- assuming without analysis that local fraternity chapter could be held liable where members engaged in hazing
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled — as noted by a later court
155 Ill. App. 3d 231, 507 N.E.2d 1193 (1987), which Prime also cites, are no longer good law.
medium confidenceAbrogated by Charles v. Seigfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482 (1995)
Quinn had been abrogated by Charles.
The opinion
JUSTICE GREEN, specially concurring:
I concur in the decision of the majority to reverse the judgment dismissing the third amended complaint. The heart of my disagreement with them is my belief that the cause of action stated there does not sound in negligence. Rather, I would treat the reference to “negligence” in the complaint as surplusage and hold that the outrageous conduct described sets forth a cause of action based upon wilful and wanton misconduct on the part of the defendant acting through its authorized agents, its active members who had authority to give orders to the pledges who were to be initiated into the fraternity.
As did the trial court, the majority correctly concludes that the crucial issue is as to what duty, if any, was owed by defendant to plaintiff under the circumstances alleged. The majority seems to indicate that the gross conduct of defendant toward plaintiff created a duty owed plaintiff. In making this determination, the majority follows the accepted doctrine of Lance v. Senior (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 516 , 224 N.E.2d 231 . It points out that (1) injuries are likely to result from requiring the consumption of almost lethal quantities of alcohol, (2) refraining from such conduct would be easy, and (3) the fraternity rather than the pledge is the better party to bear the burden of injuries. I agree that because of the existence of those factors, under the allegation of the complaint, defendant was shown to have a duty to refrain from treating plaintiff in the manner alleged. However, the tenor of the opinion is ambiguous as to whether the duty imposed on the defendant is to refrain from being negligent toward plaintiff or to refrain from the gross conduct alleged.
As I have indicated, I deem the conduct attributed to defendant to be wilful and wanton. This is the conduct to which the majority applied the test of Lance. Avoidance of that type of conduct is the only duty I would place upon defendant in regard to its imposition of requirements placed upon pledges to perform certain acts as a condition of initiation. Application of the Lance test to mere negligence in imposing such requirements does not indicate that imposition of a duty is appropriate. Ordinary negligence in making such requirements is not particularly likely to cause injury to a pledge, but guarding against injury arising from the acts of the pledge would be difficult. Although, as stated by the majority, great social pressure encourages those seeking initiation to perform required acts, the acts performed are, nevertheless, voluntary. I do not think it is advisable to extend tort liability to require fraternal organizations to bear the burden for such injuries when the directions it gave were merely negligent.
“An Act defining hazing, making the same a misdemeanor, and fixing punishment thereof,” referred to by the majority, states in full:
“Sec. 1. Whoever shall engage in the practice of hazing in this state, whereby any one sustains an injury to his person therefrom, shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 144, par. 221.
“Sec. 2. The term ‘hazing’ in this act shall be construed to mean any pastime or amusement, engaged in by students or other people in schools, academies, colleges, universities, or other educational institutions of this state, or by people connected with any of the public institutions of this state, whereby such pastime or amusement is had for the purpose of holding up any student, scholar or individual to ridicule for the pastime of others.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 144, par. 222.
An alleged violation of the foregoing legislation is involved here. However, such a violation is significant only if ordinary negligence is the basis of the action. Then, as stated, the violation is prima facie evidence of negligence. No authority has been cited to indicate that a statutory violation is prima facie evidence of wilful and wanton misconduct. The statute does not make a violation a tort, for the statute is insufficient to create a public policy. It does not “[affect] the citizens of the State collectively” as required to create public policy. (Emphasis added.) Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130 , 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 .
Thus, because I would treat the references in the complaint to negligence as surplusage, I agree that the complaint states a cause of action. To the extent that the majority opinion holds that a fraternity may be liable for mere negligence in requiring the performance of certain acts by pledges as a condition of initiation, I am in disagreement with that opinion.