applying the "'overwhelming untainted evidence' test" in which an appellate court "determine[s] if the untainted evidence is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt"
How later courts described this case
- applying the "'overwhelming untainted evidence' test" in which an appellate court "determine[s] if the untainted evidence is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt"
- stating that it is well established that a constitutional error may be so insignificant as to be harmless
- The appellate court may avoid reversal on merely technical or academic grounds while insuring that a conviction will be reversed where there is any reasonable possibility that the use of inadmissible evidence was necessary to reach a guilty verdict.
- noting that a party may only assign error in the appellate court on the specific ground of the evidentiary objection made at trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Harris, 106 Wash. 2d 784 (1986)
Thus, Guloy is inapplicable because the statement is not an out-of-court statement made by an adverse witness.
The opinion
*433 Goodloe, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I agree with all of the majority opinion, except that section addressing the defendants' right to a speedy trial. I would hold the defendants were denied a speedy trial under CrR 3.3.
CrR 3.3(i) provides:
(i) Dismissal With Prejudice. A criminal charge not brought to trial within the time period provided by this rule shall be dismissed with prejudice.
The time period provided in the rule for defendants, in the position of Ramil and Guloy, who are not released from jail pending trial, is not later than 60 days after the date of arraignment. CrR 3.3(c)(1). As directed in CrR 3.3(a), " [i]t shall be the responsibility of the court to ensure a trial in accordance with this rule to each person charged with having committed a crime."
I agree with the majority that the 60-day period started on June 10, 1981. Majority opinion, at 428. However, even using this date, the defendants were not brought to trial within 60 days. The trial court was not faced with a dilemma. On July 30, defendant Guloy sought a 5-day continuance. Had the requested 5-day continuance been granted, both defendants would have been brought to trial within the applicable 60-day speedy trial rule. Nothing in the record explains why a request for a 5-day continuance became an order for an 11-day continuance. The fact that it did violates the speedy trial rule.
I dissent from this section.