applying the "'overwhelming untainted evidence' test" in which an appellate court "determine[s] if the untainted evidence is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt"
How later courts described this case
- applying the "'overwhelming untainted evidence' test" in which an appellate court "determine[s] if the untainted evidence is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt"
- stating that it is well established that a constitutional error may be so insignificant as to be harmless
- The appellate court may avoid reversal on merely technical or academic grounds while insuring that a conviction will be reversed where there is any reasonable possibility that the use of inadmissible evidence was necessary to reach a guilty verdict.
- noting that a party may only assign error in the appellate court on the specific ground of the evidentiary objection made at trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Harris, 106 Wash. 2d 784 (1986)
Thus, Guloy is inapplicable because the statement is not an out-of-court statement made by an adverse witness.
The opinion
Brachtenbach, J.
(concurring) — I agree with the majority's analysis, including its adoption of the "overwhelming untainted evidence" test to determine if constitutional error is harmless. However, in adopting this test, I carefully distinguish those situations in which constitutional error may never be harmless. There are some constitutional vio *432 lations which undermine the fundamental fairness of the judicial process to such an extent that they require automatic reversal. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 , 71 L. Ed. 2d 379 , 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Such errors include the admission of an involuntary confession, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 , 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 , 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 , 2 L. Ed. 2d 975 , 78 S. Ct. 844 (1958) and the knowing use by the prosecutor of perjured testimony, Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 , 79 L. Ed. 791 , 55 S. Ct. 340 , 98 A.L.R. 406 (1935). Other constitutional errors potentially affect a trial in such a way that it is impossible for an appellate court to later evaluate the error to determine whether or not it was harmless. This type of error includes the failure to provide counsel for an indigent defendant, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 , 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 , 83 S. Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 , 10 L. Ed. 2d 193 , 83 S. Ct. 1050 (1963); the failure to determine that a defendant is competent to stand trial, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 , 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 , 86 S. Ct. 836 (1966); discrimination in the selection of a jury, Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 , 17 L. Ed. 2d 599 , 87 S. Ct. 643 (1967); and financial interest by a judge in the outcome of a trial, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 , 71 L. Ed. 749 , 47 S. Ct. 437 , 50 A.L.R. 1243 (1927). An appellate court can only speculate as to how the trial or the fact finder's perception of the trial would have differed had such constitutional errors not occurred. However, the admission of inadmissible evidence is not among the constitutional errors which the court must always find to be prejudicial. The court is ordinarily in a position to judge the possible effect of admitting a particular piece of evidence within the context of all the evidence presented at trial. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 , 128 n.7, 78 L. Ed. 2d 267 , 104 S. Ct. 453 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Utter, Pearson, and Andersen, JJ., concur with Brach-TENBACH, J.