holding that a termination of parental rights action is not a custody proceeding
How later courts described this case
- holding that a termination of parental rights action is not a custody proceeding
- Adoption proceedings are brought for the purpose of terminating all parental rights of the biological mother, not to establish or modify a custody decree, and therefore adoption proceedings are not governed by the UCCJA.
- jurisdiction for termination of parental rights is not encompassed by Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, as such action does not establish or modify custody decree, but is properly determined under adoption statutes
- absent a request for appointment of counsel due to economic status, and evidence in support thereof, trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying request for appointment of local counsel under I.C. 34-1-1-3
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GARRARD, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from .the majority view that the Superior Court of Porter County had proper jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of a mother who was a California resident in a child who was an Illinois resident.
I agree that under the UCCJA the court was not empowered to make such a noncustodial determination. I further agree that such a termination is a statutory mechanism, and therefore must fit within the requirements of the statute for jurisdiction to exist.
The father premises that compliance upon his status as father under the statute as it existed prior to October 1, 1979. That statute did authorize the filing of such a petition by the other parent. IC 31-3-1-7(e). However, the preceding subsection (c) specified that jurisdiction to grant such a petition was vested in “the court having jurisdiction over adoption proceedings under this chapter.”
IC 31-3-1-1 defines that jurisdiction as existing in the court having jurisdiction in probate matters “where such petitioner resides, or in which is located any duly licensed child-placing agency or governmental agency having custody of such child, or in the county where such child may be found.”
It is apparent that jurisdiction can not rest on either the second or third qualification since the child resided in Illinois and was not in the custody of an agency. Was Capps a “petitioner” within the meaning of the statute? Clearly he technically was not since the preceding portion of the sentence quoted from restricts the section to “[a]ny resident of this state desirous of adopting any person under eighteen years of age ... may ... file a petition.” “Petition” refers to a petition for adoption, and none was filed in this case. Petitioner equally clearly refers to a petitioner for adoption and Capps did not qualify as such. The majority recognizes as much in conceding that Capps does not literally come under the statute.
Traditionally, we have held that one desiring the benefit of a special statutory action must bring himself squarely within all the requirements of the statute or he may not succeed. See, e. g., Watson v. Strohl (1943), 220 Ind. 672 , 46 N.E.2d 204 ; Blade Corp. v. American Drywall, Inc. (1980), Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 1183 ; DeMayo v. State ex rel. Dept. of Natural Resources (1979), Ind.App., 394 N.E.2d 258 . I feel that rule of law is especially appropriate where we are attempting to litigate the existence of the parent-child relationship between two non-residents of the State of Indiana.
Therefore, I dissent.