“Although both parties wish to debate whether defendant violated section 11-1303(a)(1)(j) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, such a determination need not be made for purposes of determining whether the gun seized from defendant must be suppressed. The key question is whether Officer Jocson had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity such that he could approach the vehicle.”
How later courts described this case
- “Although both parties wish to debate whether defendant violated section 11-1303(a)(1)(j) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, such a determination need not be made for purposes of determining whether the gun seized from defendant must be suppressed. The key question is whether Officer Jocson had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity such that he could approach the vehicle.”
- “Although both parties wish to debate whether defendant violated section 11-1303(a)(1)(j
- improper impeachment subject to harmless error analysis
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE McLAREN, dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. I authored People v. Lambert (2d Dist. May 19, 1992), No. 2—90—0363 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), which was a Supreme Court Rule 23 dispositional order which reversed the judgment and remanded the cause on other grounds. Frederick Lambert was one of three defendants charged with Mr. Simmons’ homicide. Mr. Chatmon, defendant herein, and Clementhis Lambert were the two other defendants charged. I do not cite to the Lambert disposition as precedent but rather to show that I remain consistent in my judgment as to the weight attributed to Lori Mullins’ testimony. I wrote therein:
“It would be unjust to convict defendant based upon Mullins’ statements alone. However, other evidence was provided by the State which would, if believed, be sufficient to both corroborate certain aspects of Mullins’ testimony and support a conviction. Most notably, we refer to the statements Louis Leavy gave to the police. Leavy’s statements tend to incriminate defendant.” Lambert, slip R. 23, at 6.
In the above-cited Lambert case, Stacy Lovings’ testimony was presented to the jury, and the jury was properly instructed to use the prior statements made by Lovings only for purposes of impeachment. In the present case, her prior inconsistent statements were improperly submitted as substantive evidence.
I must disagree with the majority that the defendant has not shown reversible error. I reasonably believe the jury could have found Mr. Chatmon not guilty if Stacy Lovings’ testimony had been properly presented to the jury. I, therefore, would determine that reversible error was committed and remand the cause for a new trial.