concluding that, although issue of subject-matter jurisdiction was not raised in Leech v. American Booksellers Ass’n, 582 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1979), supreme court’s holding therein that Tennessee obscenity statute was unconstitutional constituted implicit ruling that court had jurisdiction to entertain declaratory judgment action challenging statute’s constitutionality
How later courts described this case
- concluding that, although issue of subject-matter jurisdiction was not raised in Leech v. American Booksellers Ass’n, 582 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1979), supreme court’s holding therein that Tennessee obscenity statute was unconstitutional constituted implicit ruling that court had jurisdiction to entertain declaratory judgment action challenging statute’s constitutionality
- holding that a party may bring an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute and distinguishing Hill v. Beeler
- recognizing that the right to privacy renders the state sodomy statute unconstitutional
- "[Tennessee] citizen's fundamental right to privacy (`the right to be let alone'
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 589 (2008)
926 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) abrogated on other grounds by Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827
The opinion
CANTRELL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from part I of the majority opinion holding that the appellants have standing to maintain this action under the Declaratory Judgment Act. In my opinion this case does not involve present rights that have accrued under presently existing facts. See Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn.App.1992).
None of the plaintiffs in this action have been prosecuted under the HPA; none of them allege that they have even been threatened with prosecution. They do allege that they fear they will be prosecuted for engaging in conduct prohibited by the Act. I do not think such allegations give the plaintiffs a special interest in the statute as opposed to the public in general. See Parks v. Alexander, 608 S.W.2d 881 (Tenn.App.1980). All the complaint expresses is a fear that the plaintiffs will be prosecuted if they choose to violate the Act. Every member of the public is affected in exactly the same way.
The plaintiffs’ reliance on Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278 , 300 S.W. 565 (1927) is misplaced. In that case the plaintiffs were the owners and operators of a legal business that would be closed by the operation of the statute in question. Their interests were different from the interests of the public at large. They had a right under presently existing facts to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
For these reasons the State’s motion to dismiss should have been granted.
II.
On the merits of this appeal, I concur in part III of the majority opinion.