referencing the legislative findings made by the General Assembly when enacting the Illinois Environmental Protection Act which demonstrated a need for “a unified, state-wide program,” as well as the comments of the Local Government Committee in its report to the Illinois Constitutional Convention
How later courts described this case
- referencing the legislative findings made by the General Assembly when enacting the Illinois Environmental Protection Act which demonstrated a need for “a unified, state-wide program,” as well as the comments of the Local Government Committee in its report to the Illinois Constitutional Convention
- noise caused by single automobile honking louder than allowed by municipal noise control ordinance of local concern; noise caused by train travelling interstate across municipal boundaries is not
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting:
This opinion now extends into the field of noise pollution the same theory of preemption that has heretofore been applied in landfill and sewage disposal operations in O’Connor v. City of Rockford (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 360 ; Carlson v. Village of Worth (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 406 , and Metropolitan Sanitary District v. City of Des Plaines (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 256 .
In Village of Worth, as noted in my dissent to the supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing and in the dissent of the Chief Justice, this construction conferred upon the Environmental Protection Agency authority which that agency itself as well as the Attorney General insisted was not intended by the legislature. Neither the Environmental Protection Agency nor the Pollution Control Board is a party to this suit, and neither one has filed briefs herein. Therefore, the majority opinion gave no consideration to the question of whether or not it is feasible or in fact possible for noise pollution throughout the State to be effectively policed by the Environmental Protection Agency.
It is interesting to note that the opinions of this court in the three cases cited above were bottomed on the fact that the Environmental Protection Agency had issued permits for the particular operation at issue in those cases. For this reason the majority concluded that the local governmental unit could not require compliance with the local ordinance.
In the case now before us there were no permits issued by the Environmental Protection Agency to the railroad for the emission of noise. In fact there was no State regulation of the noise emission for which the defendant was being proceeded against by the city. The Illinois Pollution Control Board had adopted regulations establishing limits on noise emissions from railroad yards, but they were not to become effective until a later date. Thus, at the time of the violation of the city ordinance there was no State regulation of the emission of noise by the defendant. These facts completely distinguish this case from the three cases cited above.
Regardless of the factual distinction, I firmly believe that the preemption doctrine as espoused by the majority opinion is going to impose upon the Environmental Protection Agency an impossible burden of policing the entire State of Illinois, including every city and village, for the eradication of noise pollution. In this area, above all others, effective elimination of pollution must of necessity involve local governmental units. It will be absolutely impossible for the Environmental Protection Agency under the authority conferred upon it and the Pollution Control Board, by the Environmental Protection Act, to eliminate the offending noise eminating from every motor vehicle, siren, train whistle, and the like throughout the State. The majority opinion in effect invalidates every ordinance regulating horn honking, tire squealing, and noisy mufflers. Also, the majority opinion gives no consideration to the specific grant to municipalities of statutory authority to prevent and suppress noises. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 11-5-2.
Any effective control of noise pollution requires that we adhere to the position of this court as stated in City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 484 , that is, that local governmental units are not precluded from adopting and enforcing local ordinances in the environmental protection field, acting concurrently with the State.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH joins in this dissent.