“[T]he final judgment regarding admission of an applicant to the practice of law rests with this court. As a general rule, a determination by the Committee on Character and Fitness concerning the character and fitness of an applicant neither binds this court nor limits our authority to take action.... [W]here a hearing panel concludes that a petitioner does not possess the good moral character and general fitness necessary for the practice of law and recommends that certification be denied[,] ... this court will not reverse unless *439 that recommendation was arbitrary.” (Citations omitted.)
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he final judgment regarding admission of an applicant to the practice of law rests with this court. As a general rule, a determination by the Committee on Character and Fitness concerning the character and fitness of an applicant neither binds this court nor limits our authority to take action.... [W]here a hearing panel concludes that a petitioner does not possess the good moral character and general fitness necessary for the practice of law and recommends that certification be denied[,] ... this court will not reverse unless *439 that recommendation was arbitrary.” (Citations omitted.)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring:
I agree with the majority that the petitioner’s application for admission to the bar of this state must be denied. I write separately to explain more fully the basis for my agreement with that determination and to respond to Justice McMorrow’s dissent in this case.
As the majority recounts, the petitioner, while a licensed insurance professional, took part in an extensive scheme to systematically defraud insurance companies. The petitioner took a job in the office of a person who owned taxi cabs. Whenever a driver was involved in an accident, the petitioner would have the person go to a particular doctor. The doctor would later send out inflated bills containing charges for unnecessary or unperformed services. The petitioner would then submit the bills to insurance companies for reimbursement. This activity went on from August 1986 through February 1987; according to the petitioner, he submitted scores of fraudulent claims to eight different insurers. Indicted the next year, the petitioner was later allowed to plead guilty to one count of the 82-count indictment in exchange for his testimony as a witness for the prosecution.
Justice McMorrow asserts that the effect of today’s decision denying the petitioner’s application for admission to the bar “is to impose additional punishment upon him after he has been tried and served the sentence which was deemed appropriate by agreement of the court and the prosecution in his criminal case.” 194 Ill. 2d at 134 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice McMorrow apparently believes that the seriousness of an applicant’s offense must necessarily fade over time, and that, in any event, the severity of the misconduct should be measured simply by the criminal sanction imposed at the time of prosecution.
These notions are contrary to long-standing precedent of this court. In In re Childress, 138 Ill. 2d 87 (1990), an applicant who had been convicted of rape and robbery 16 years earlier applied for admission to the bar of this state, long after his release from prison. The court observed that a felony conviction will not automatically preclude an applicant’s admission to the bar, or a disbarred attorney’s subsequent reinstatement. The court further explained:
“It is clear, however, that the degree of rehabilitation that must be established to warrant admission or reinstatement will depend in large measure on the nature of the wrong committed. Just as a disbarred attorney’s subsequent exemplary behavior will not mitigate the seriousness of his misconduct (In re Alexander (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 524, 534-35 ; In re Berkley (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 404, 410 ), so too will an applicant’s subsequent exemplary behavior fail to lessen the enormity of an earlier offense.” Childress, 138 Ill. 2d at 101 .
Despite the lengthy period of time in that case between the petitioner’s offenses and his application, this court concluded that time alone was not sufficient to overcome the enormity of the applicant’s misconduct. The court stated, “While a person’s conduct in the ensuing years is, of course, a relevant circumstance in assessing rehabilitation, we do not believe that the passage of time by itself is sufficient to demonstrate the rehabilitation that is required of someone with a criminal record such as petitioner’s.” Childress, 138 Ill. 2d at 102 .
A number of considerations are relevant in this case. The petitioner was involved in an extensive, fraudulent scheme, and he played an active role in the commission of those offenses. Moreover, the petitioner was 45 years old at the time of his involvement; thus, his offenses were not youthful indiscretions, but the work of a mature adult, and they were closely related to what was then his career in insurance. Also, the petitioner, who applied to and was accepted by his law school after these offenses, was not completely candid to the school about this misconduct and, separately, failed to report on his law school application three prior misdemeanor charges, two of which resulted in guilty pleas. Just as there are some offenses so egregious that a lawyer who has been disbarred for committing them may never be readmitted to the bar (In re Richman, 191 Ill. 2d 238, 247-48 (2000); In re Rothenberg, 108 Ill. 2d 313, 326 (1985)), so too, I believe, are there offenses so serious that one who has committed them should never be entitled to admission to the bar in the first place. Without determining whether the present offenses fall into that category, I believe that it is clear that the petitioner’s application must be denied. The nature and gravity of the petitioner’s misconduct, his age when he engaged in it, and his later lack of candor concerning these and prior offenses on his law school application and in the ensuing application process all militate against his admission to the bar.
JUSTICE RATHJE joins in this special concurrence.