Opinion

Diane DOWNS Ex Rel. Ryan Cody DOWNS v. Mark BUSH Et Al.

  • 263 S.W.3d 812
  • 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 588
Court
Tennessee Supreme Court
Filed
Sep 10, 2008
Status
Published
Author
Holder
On the bench
Chief Justice William M. Barker
Cited by
90 cases
Authority
More cited than 4.6%

concluding that there was evidence to support a finding that driver did not “take charge of’ intoxicated passenger, because “the record also indicates that Mr. Downs did not object to riding in the bed of the truck and that he climbed into it under his own strength”

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that there was evidence to support a finding that driver did not “take charge of’ intoxicated passenger, because “the record also indicates that Mr. Downs did not object to riding in the bed of the truck and that he climbed into it under his own strength”
  • concluding that whether intoxicated. passenger was “helpless” was a genuine issue of material fact for trial
  • a negligence claim requires proof of each of the following elements: “(1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defendant falling below the standard of care amounting to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) cause in fact; and (5) proximate or legal cause”
  • relying on West v. E. Tennessee Pioneer Oil Co., 172 S.W.3d 545, 552 (Tenn. 2005), for the principle that “[f]oreseeability is the test of negligence”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

JANICE M. HOLDER, J.,

concurring

and dissenting.

I concur in the majority’s determination that the case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Unlike the majority, however, I would conclude that the defendants owed a duty of care to the decedent. I would therefore remand with instructions for the jury to decide questions of fact relevant only to determinations of whether the defendants breached that duty and caused the decedent’s death. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 375 , 2008 WL 4135605 (Tenn.2008) (Holder, J., dissenting).

“As we have stated on numerous occasions, the existence or nonexistence of a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant is entirely a question of law for the court.” Carson v. Headrick, 900 S.W.2d 685, 690 (Tenn.1995); see also Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn.1993); McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 774 (Tenn.1991). The majority nonetheless remands the issue of duty to the jury thereby transforming this question of law into a question of fact. The majority’s result arises from the incorporation of foreseeability into an analysis of duty and demonstrates why that approach is inherently flawed.

In my view, a duty of reasonable care arises whenever a defendant’s conduct poses a risk of harm to persons or property. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 375 (Holder, J., dissenting). The existence of a duty is generally presumed as long as the plaintiff alleges that he or she was harmed by the defendant’s conduct. Id. The existence of a duty is akin to a policy determination that a relationship exists sufficient to impose a duty to use reasonable care. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 Vand. L.Rev. 739 (2005) (“At its core, duty — the imposition upon a class of actors of an obligation of certain conduct — inescapably involves matters of policy.”)

The majority correctly notes that “[g]en-erally, drivers of a vehicle owe their passengers a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances while driving” but nonetheless declines to assert that a duty exists. In this case, the defendants engaged in risky behavior by drinking in excess and driving on the interstate with an unrestrained, intoxicated passenger in the bed of the truck. Their conduct created a risk of harm. Thus, the defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care. *827 Whether the defendants placed the decedent in the back of the truck or the decedent climbed in the back of the truck voluntarily is relevant only to a determination of whether the defendants breached their duty of reasonable care and caused the decedent’s death.

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment with instructions that the existence of a duty has been established and remand for further proceedings consistent with this holding.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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