noting that “parties may agree to a ‘hybrid’ sentence that ‘mixes and matches’ range assignment, term of years, and release eligibility without regard to what our sentencing scheme might call for absent a plea bargain so long as (1) the term of years is within the overall range of years specified for the offense, and (2) the RED (release eligibility date) is not less than the minimum allowable for the offense”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “parties may agree to a ‘hybrid’ sentence that ‘mixes and matches’ range assignment, term of years, and release eligibility without regard to what our sentencing scheme might call for absent a plea bargain so long as (1) the term of years is within the overall range of years specified for the offense, and (2) the RED (release eligibility date) is not less than the minimum allowable for the offense”
- noting the seriousness accorded to violations of the Drug-Free School Zone Act by the Tennessee Legislature and that “it is entirely permissible–and legal–for a trial court, after considering mitigating and enhancement factors, to sentence a defendant who committed a drug offense in a school zone to the maximum term of years in the defendant’s range.”
- stating that “defendants dealing drugs in school zones who are sentenced to the minimum term in their sentencing range will serve literally 100% of their sentences”
- concluding that a defendant’s power to negotiate an -3- acceptable plea agreement includes the power to “forego entirely” a release eligibility date
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SHARON G. LEE, J.,
concurring.
I write separately to state my position in this case. I concur with the views of my colleagues as expressed in the majority and concurring opinions that the defendant is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. My decision in this case would have been different had the trial court imposed this sentence on the defendant after a trial. However, because this was a voluntary guilty plea agreement, and not a sentence imposed by the trial court following a trial, the defendant waived any habeas corpus relief he may have been entitled to receive because the sentence he bargained for was within the statutory minimum and statutory maximum for the offense.
I do not join in Justice Wade’s concurring opinion because I do not think this is the appropriate case to decide the viability of Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn.2008). The majority opinion does not rely on Edwards nor cite it for any legal proposition. Neither party briefed or argued the merits of Edwards. Edwards is factually distinguishable as it involved a sentence imposed by the trial court after a trial, whereas this case concerns a guilty plea. Therefore, the affir-mance or reversal of Edwards should await a day when the issue is squarely before the Court. Today is not that day.