explaining that pursuant to the applicable summary judgment standard, a moving party may shift the burden of production to the non-moving party by “show[ing] that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that pursuant to the applicable summary judgment standard, a moving party may shift the burden of production to the non-moving party by “show[ing] that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.”
- stating that “this Court . . . rejected the federal McDonnell Douglas framework of allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof of each party in favor of the ordinary Tennessee summary judgment standard”
- noting that section 20-16-101 is only applicable to actions filed on or after July 1, 2011
- stating that there is no requirement that a plaintiff show an instruction from his or her employer to participate in illegal activities
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J.,
concurring.
The Court has reached a result in this case that is consistent with Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796 (Tenn.2010) and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn.2010). However, as reflected in Chief Justice Clark’s separate opinions in both Kinsler and Gossett , I continue to believe that abandoning the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) framework that had served Tennessee’s courts well for many years in both Whistleblower Act claims and claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act was a mistake.