holding that it is not an abuse of discretion to make an award of alimony that is reasonable under the circumstances
How later courts described this case
- holding that it is not an abuse of discretion to make an award of alimony that is reasonable under the circumstances
- “We -17- have long recognized that circuit courts, in traditional equity cases, have broad powers to distribute the property in order to achieve an equitable division.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PAUL E. DANIELSON, Justice, concurring.
I agree that the circuit court’s award of payments to Andrea Russell should be affirmed; however, I take issue with the majority opinion failing to property characterize these payments. Clearly, they are not “alimony” in the traditional sense as it has long been established that “an award of alimony in fixed installments for a specified period is prima facie erroneous as being an award of a gross sum instead of a continuing allowance.” Webb v. Webb, 262 Ark. 461, 462 , 557 S.W.2d 878 , 879 112(1977) (citing Beasley v. Beasley, 247 Ark. 338 , 445 S.W.2d 500 (1969); McIlroy v. McIlroy, 191 Ark. 45 , 83 S.W.2d 550 (1935); Walker v. Walker, 147 Ark. 376 , 227 S.W. 762 (1921); Brown v. Brown, 38 Ark. 324 (1881)). However, this court has acknowledged that, depending on the facts of a particular case, such a short-term award may be a proper method of allocating to the wife an interest in her husband’s property. See id. In the instant case, the circuit court used its discretion to do just that. However, it should not be confused with, nor subjected to the primary considerations given to, an award of alimony.