“prosecutor could properly urge the imposition of death as a deterrent to murder”
How later courts described this case
- “prosecutor could properly urge the imposition of death as a deterrent to murder”
- "the proof of guilt is overwhelming"
- statutory aggravating factor "no significant history of prior criminal history" is neither vague nor overly broad
- counsel is not required to file futile motions in order to provide effective representation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE RYAN, also concurring:
I concur in the opinion and the judgment of the court in this case. I also join in the concurrences of Mr. Chief Justice Goldenhersh and Mr. Justice Clark, who have expressed precisely my reason for no longer adhering to the rationale of the dissent which I authored in People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 531, 544 , cert, denied (1980), 445 U.S. 953 , 63 L. Ed. 2d 788 , 100 S. Ct. 603 . Having authored that dissent, which now forms the basis of Mr. Justice Simon’s dissent in this case, I feel compelled to add my observations to those made by the chief justice and Mr. Justice Clark.
In considering the question with which the chief justice, Mr. Justice Clark and I are faced, one is compelled to accept the very fundamental concept that ours is a government of law and not of men. In fact, this court has incorporated that concept in the Standards of Judicial Conduct by providing in our Rule 61(c)(1):
“A judge should bear in mind that ours is a government of law and not of men and that his duty is the application of general law to particular instances.” 73 Ill. 2d R. 61(c)(1).
This court, not seven individual justices, has considered the constitutionality of our death penalty statute and this court found it to be constitutional. Those of us who disagree with that conclusion voiced our dissent. Having done so, it is now our obligation to accept the law as pronounced by this court. This is not to say that the holdings of this court are cast in stone and forever unchangeable. However, nothing has changed since this court’s decision in Cousins except one member of the court that decided Cousins has retired. As Mr. Justice Clark stated in his concurrence, the circumstances which warrant changes in the law do not include changes in personnel of the court. If the law were to change with each change in the makeup of the court, then the concept that ours is a government of law and not of men would be nothing more than a pious cliche.
For this reason, although I authored the dissent in Cousins, I concur in the opinion and judgment of the court in this case.