“prosecutor could properly urge the imposition of death as a deterrent to murder”
How later courts described this case
- “prosecutor could properly urge the imposition of death as a deterrent to murder”
- "the proof of guilt is overwhelming"
- statutory aggravating factor "no significant history of prior criminal history" is neither vague nor overly broad
- counsel is not required to file futile motions in order to provide effective representation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, concurring:
I joined Mr. Justice Ryan in his dissent in People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 531 , and for the reasons therein stated am of the opinion that the death penalty provisions of section 9—1 of the Criminal Code are unconstitutional. Following the decision of People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins I have concurred in several opinions pertaining to the application of certain provisions of section 9—1. (People v. Greer (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 103 ; People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 508 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564 ; People v. Walker (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 512 .) Because it was held that the death penalty could not be imposed in those cases, there was no reason to explain my concurrence in the court’s opinions.
It is apparent that the General Assembly and a majority of the electorate of this State desire that the death penalty be available as a sanction in certain types of cases. If this court were the final tribunal to determine the validity of the statute in its present form I would continue to dissent in the hope that ultimately a majority of the court would agree or that the General Assembly might be persuaded to effect the amendments which I consider necessary to render the statute valid. In this situation, however, the Supreme Court can grant certiorari and decide the questions on which this court is divided.
Once this court has spoken, I, like any other citizen of Illinois, must acquiesce in its decision. That there be a final decision on the issue is of great importance for the reason that there are now pending before this court 26 cases wherein death penalties have been imposed. It is essential that the question of the validity of the statute be determined. Consequently, with considerable reluctance, under the compulsion of People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, I concur in the opinion affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County.