concluding, based on Chambers, that, “where hearsay testimony bears persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and is critical to the accused’s defense, its exclusion deprives the defendant of a fair trial in accord with due process”
How later courts described this case
- concluding, based on Chambers, that, “where hearsay testimony bears persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and is critical to the accused’s defense, its exclusion deprives the defendant of a fair trial in accord with due process”
- having -35- No. 2--05--0826 heard the accomplice's testimony, the jury was fully aware of his criminal background and of his agreement with the State, and it was the jury's function to decide whether there was a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
- having heard the accomplice's testimony, the jury was fully aware of his criminal background and of his agreement with the State, and it was the jury's function to decide whether there was a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
- noting that the State’s prior use of a disputed statement in the defendant’s earlier trial was an additional indicium of reliability
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring:
I agree with the result reached by the majority. I write separately because I would hold that Tenney is entitled to a new trial for an additional reason not mentioned by my colleagues, namely, that he was tried, convicted and sentenced under a death penalty law that violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 225 (1998) (Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In response to the demonstrated failure of this state’s death penalty law, our court has now adopted a comprehensive set of new rules governing the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking imposition of a death sentence. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 631-36 (2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in those rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now coming before us on review. Whether the new rules will be sufficient to place this state’s capital punishment system within the tolerances permitted by the state and federal constitutions is a question we cannot yet answer. It is clear, however, that no proceeding conducted without the benefit of those rules can be deemed reliable. Tenney’s was such a proceeding. For that reason, in addition to the reasons given by the majority, I agree that Tenney’s conviction and sentence must be set aside and that he must be granted a new trial.
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also specially concurring:
I completely agree with the majority’s judgment and rationale for a new trial in this cause. Nevertheless, I agree with Chief Justice Harrison that defendant’s convictions and sentence should also be set aside because the trial proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the new supreme court rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my dissents in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 636-40 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536, 581-85 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), the procedures in capital cases prior to this court’s adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not sufficiently protect a defendant’s constitutional rights. Consequently, the rules, promulgated to help remedy the flaws of the old system, must be applied retroactively to all capital cases currently pending on direct appeal. See People v. Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (2001); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 661 , 107 S. Ct. 708, 716 (1987). For this additional reason, defendant should receive a new trial in compliance with the new rules.