we may affirm summary judgment on any ground
How later courts described this case
- we may affirm summary judgment on any ground
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE WOLFSON, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Paragraph 14B of the lease between Auster Trust and Auster Company provides that the “Lessor [Auster Trust] shall be solely responsible, at Lessor’s sole cost and expense, to maintain the roof, foundation and structural elements of the building in which the Leased Premises is located.” The trust cannot be liable for the injury that occurred here if the elevator was not a “structural element” within the meaning of the lease.
I do not see a fact issue concerning the elevator in the case against the Trust. Neither side presented or proposed any facts that would help in construing the language of the lease. There is no factual setting. It is simply a matter of contract construction for the trial court to decide.
It is said that when interpreting contracts “ ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’ ” Z.R.L. Corp. v. Great Central Insurance Co., 156 Ill. App. 3d 856, 859 (1987), quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 , 6 L. Ed. 2d 859, 863 , 81 S. Ct. 1579, 1582 (1961). Put more formally, long-standing Illinois law holds it to be a general rule in construing contracts “that where an enumeration of specific things is followed by general words or phrases, the latter are held to refer to things of the same kind as those specified.” Webber v. City of Chicago, 148 Ill. 313, 318 (1894). See also 17A C.J.S. Contracts §321 (1999) (“The meaning of words in a contract may be indicated or controlled by those words with which they are associated”).
Here, the words “structural elements” are associated with, and are in the company of, “roof’ and “foundation.” I do not see how an elevator can be included within the “structural elements” of the building. It just does not fit. There is nothing ambiguous about paragraph 14B. For that reason, I respectfully dissent from the decision to reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Trust.
At the same time, the majority’s excellent analysis of this unusual scenario persuades me there is a factual issue concerning the claim that, despite the sublease, the company controlled and possessed the premises at the time of the accident. See Guerino v. Depot Place Partnership, 273 Ill. App. 3d 27, 31 (1995). I concur in the majority’s reversal and remand of summary judgment entered on behalf of the Auster Company.