“Mr. Moore at least had the benefit of admitting his involvement, admitting his crime, the first step to redemption, perhaps. We have a continual denial here by Mr. Byrd of any involvement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
How later courts described this case
- “Mr. Moore at least had the benefit of admitting his involvement, admitting his crime, the first step to redemption, perhaps. We have a continual denial here by Mr. Byrd of any involvement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
- “A more severe sentence may not be imposed ... because .. [a defendant] has exercised his constitutional right to trial.... ’
- "A more severe sentence may not be imposed because a defendant refuses to abandon his claim of innocence...."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE JONES, dissenting:
I concur with the majority in its affirmance of defendant’s conviction, but I respectfully dissent from its action in remanding for a new sentencing hearing.
A fair reading of the remarks of the trial court at the time of pronouncing sentence, set forth by the majority, cannot lead to the conclusion that defendant was receiving a more severe sentence than his codefendant because he refused to admit guilt. Such a reading is overly broad and, in view of the result in many similar cases, unwarranted. The majority itself discusses the reason why defendant deserved and received a more severe sentence.
The trial court expressly noted that it was considering the statutory factors to be considered in sentencing, both in aggravation and mitigation. The reference to defendant’s refusal to admit guilt was plainly made with regard to defendant’s potential for rehabilitation and nothing more. There is nothing at all in the court’s remarks to suggest that defendant was being punished for his refusal to admit guilt.
The court’s remarks regarding defendant’s refusal to admit guilt are well within the established rule that the court may consider the lack of a penitent spirit in determining an appropriate sentence because it is a factor that may have a bearing on the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. People v. Danis (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 664 , 472 N.E.2d 1194 ; People v. Speed (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 348 , 472 N.E.2d 572 ; People v. Rodriquez (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 244 , 426 N.E.2d 586 ; People v. Costello (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 680 , 420 N.E.2d 592 ; People v. Mosley (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 903 , 409 N.E.2d 381 ; People v. Porter (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 720 , 404 N.E.2d 337 ; People v. Coleman (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 429 , 403 N.E.2d 1266 . Also see People v. Albanese (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 54 , 464 N.E.2d 206 , and People v. Sivels (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 102 , 324 N.E.2d 422 .
I would affirm the case in its entirety.