finding that the language “releases and forever discharges [the defendant] . . . from any and all claims . . . known and unknown” was broad enough to preclude the subsequent suit (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- finding that the language “releases and forever discharges [the defendant] . . . from any and all claims . . . known and unknown” was broad enough to preclude the subsequent suit (emphasis added)
- stating that both the meaning of a written agreement and the intent of the parties is to be gathered from the face of the document without assistance from extrinsic evidence
- finding release unambiguous, comprehensive, and applicable to a claim not expressly enumerated where the release used only general language relating to “any and all claims”
- giving effect to a settlement that released any and all claims “on account of all injuries, known and un known, ... which have resulted or may in the future develop from an accident which occurred”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by McNamara v. Shermer, 157 Ill. App. 3d 864 (1987)
We also reject defendants’ argument that Alsup is not controlling and that the holding in Rakowski v. Lucente (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 317, 472 N.E.2d 791, is dispositive of this matter.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting:
In my opinion, the holding in this case as to the effect of a general release cannot be squared with the majority opinion in Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 196 . In fact, the explanation of the majority in this case as to why the general release released all claims tracks closely the rationale of my dissent in Alsup. The arguments put forth in the opinion in this case, in support of the holding that a general release releases all claims, apply equally well to the argument that a general release should also release all tortfeasors.
If Alsup is the law of this State (and, unfortunately, it is), then for the sake of consistency, the general release in this case should be construed as not releasing the right of contribution. Section 2 of the Contribution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 302) does not justify the distinction. I therefore dissent.
JUSTICE UNDERWOOD joins in this dissent.