“[H]earsay found to be reliable and credible may 13 constitute substantial evidence especially where the evidence is uncontradicted; but without extrinsic corroboration . . . such evidence will be scrutinized carefully.”
How later courts described this case
- “[H]earsay found to be reliable and credible may 13 constitute substantial evidence especially where the evidence is uncontradicted; but without extrinsic corroboration . . . such evidence will be scrutinized carefully.”
- “[H]earsay found to be reliable and credible may constitute substantial evidence especially where the evidence is uncontradicted, but without extrinsic corroboration ... such evidence will be scrutinized carefully.”
- voluntary quit where employee orally resigned
- “Hearsay found to be reliable and credible may constitute substantial evidence .... ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KING, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join fully in the opinion of the court, but write separately to express my concern with what appears to be a disturbing trend in this agency. For the third time since April of 1994 we must reverse one of this agency’s orders because the Acting Chief of the Office of Appeals and Review (“OAR”) improperly rejected factual findings made by an appeals examiner who had conducted the hearing and *379 heard from and evaluated the witnesses who appeared.
In District of Columbia v. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 640 A.2d 1039 (D.C.1994), OAR reversed a finding of employee misconduct where the record showed considerable support for the appeals examiner’s determination that a District of Columbia Department of Finance and Revenue employee used confidential information, which she learned of as a result of her employment, to file fraudulent personal income tax returns with the District. And, in Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge v. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 641 A2d 172 (D.C.1994), the appeals examiner’s finding that the employee violated the employer’s policy by drinking on the job, after he had been warned that such conduct violated work rules, was rejected by OAR even though there was more than ample evidence to support that finding. We have repeatedly said that an agency may not substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the hearing examiner because doing so “would essentially scrap the principle of deference to the examiner who actually hears the testimony and is in the best position to make such determination.” Gunty v. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 524 A.2d 1192, 1197 (D.C.1987). In this case OAR has again ignored the holding of Gunty and made a factual determination it was not permitted to make.
We are constrained by our authorities to defer to agency determinations properly within the scope of its responsibility. See Proulx v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Bd., 430 A.2d 34, 35 (D.C.1981) (“An agency’s findings of fact are conclusive on this court unless unsupported by substantial evidence in the record”) (citation omitted); see also Barry v. Wilson, 448 A.2d 244, 246 (D.C.1982) (courts “must be particularly deferential to agency determination where the decision lies within the agency’s expertise”). No less is expected of the agency itself when reviewing the actions of its subordinate officials.