holding that where a taxing authority intends to conduct a sale of real property because of nonpayment of taxes, it must notify the record owner of property by personal service or certified mail, and where the mailed notice has not been delivered because of an inaccurate address, the authority must make a reasonable effort to ascertain the identity and whereabouts of the owner(s)
How later courts described this case
- holding that where a taxing authority intends to conduct a sale of real property because of nonpayment of taxes, it must notify the record owner of property by personal service or certified mail, and where the mailed notice has not been delivered because of an inaccurate address, the authority must make a reasonable effort to ascertain the identity and whereabouts of the owner(s)
- holding that where a taxing authority intends to conduct a sale of real property because of nonpayment of taxes and the mailed notice has not been delivered 10 because of an inaccurate address, the authority must make a reasonable effort to ascertain the identity and whereabouts of the owner.
- holding that where the mailed notice of an impending tax sale has not been delivered because of an inaccurate address, the taxing authorily must make a reasonable effort to ascertain the identity and whereabouts of the owners before such sale
- holding that after a mailed tax notice was not delivered because of an inaccurate address, “a reasonable effort would have been to make inquiry of the [State partnership] records ... ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by FS Partners v. York County TCB and T.R. Steele, 2016 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 32 (2016)
507 Pa. 288, 489 A.2d 1334 (1985), relied on by FS, is also inapplicable here.
Distinguished by Prince George Center, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 704 A.2d 141 (1997)
Accordingly, Geier and Tracy are inapposite to our determination in this case.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I strongly disagree with the procedure required of the Tax Bureau to satisfy our Constitution. Once again, the majority has overextended the holding of Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 , 103 S.Ct. 2706 , 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983), thus tainting the essence of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). Under Mullane, the United States Supreme Court required reasonable notice, under the circumstances, to parties who were about to lose their property *298 interest, so as to give them the opportunity to object. Thus, the Supreme Court required personal notice to any known beneficiary of a common trust prior to the scheduled judicial settlement of the accounting. Likewise, in Mennonite Board, the Supreme Court only required that personal service be given to a record owner prior to any attempt to divest his property interest. Constructive notice was constitutionally infirm when the owner’s identity was ascertainable from public records. Today, the majority extends this rationale to require the Tax Bureau to take affirmative action to ascertain the owner when such identity is not of record.
As the majority correctly states today,
The thrust of this analysis, as applied to Mennonite Board, is that where the name and address of the party affected are known or ascertainable after reasonable effort to determine them, a party with a legally protected property interest “is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale. Id. at 793, 103 S.Ct. at 2708 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 187 .
At p. 1338.
Such a reasonable mechanism exists as the result of the adoption of the Fictitious Name Act, formerly 54 P.S. 28.1 et seq., now 54 Pa.C.S.A. § 101 et seq., which requires registration of all interested parties and their addresses when operating under a fictitious name. Therefore, I see no problem with requiring a taxing body to examine the Fictitious Name Registry. However, I cannot agree that a taxing body must do more if the property owner has failed to comply with the statute promulgated to insure that real parties in interest are listed so as to enable the general public to discover, locate and identify them. As Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Mennonite Board stated, “if the members of a particular class generally possess the ability to safeguard their interests, then this fact must be taken into account when we consider the ‘totality of circumstances’ as required by Mullane.” 103 S.Ct. at 2714 . Thus, if a party fails to comply with the Fictitious Name Act as *299 required by law, this Court should not create a safeguard for those individuals who fail to protect their own interests.
In the present case, I would have only required the Tax Bureau to examine the Fictitious Name Registry to comply with constitutional notice requirements. If the Appellants failed to amend their registration, then the Bureau cannot be held responsible for its inability to ascertain the true identity and location of the real parties in interest. The majority’s expansion of Mullane and Mennonite Board is unwarranted. Both cases required reasonable efforts to ascertain landowners prior to disposition of property. Today, the majority places an unreasonable burden upon the Tax Bureau, requiring it to ascertain the true identity of property owners who fail to safeguard their own interests.
For these reasons, I cannot agree with this Court’s new constitutional requirement.
LARSEN, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.