holding that defendant charged with being an accomplice to murder was entitled to jury instruction on reckless homicide where there was “a serious evidentiary dispute” about the culpability of the principal actor
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant charged with being an accomplice to murder was entitled to jury instruction on reckless homicide where there was “a serious evidentiary dispute” about the culpability of the principal actor
- holding on direct appeal that trial court erred in refusing reckless homicide instruction where erroneously excluded evidence indicated that defendant's husband's fatal act of striking child in the head with a large wooden paddle was accidental
- affirming neglect conviction where evidence demonstrated that the defendant knew her child needed medical treatment and failed to provide it, instead attempting therapy at home
- holding that “conviction of an accomplice requires sufficient proof of the underlying crime”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BOEHM, Justice,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in the part of the opinion affirming Brown's conviction for neglect of a dependent causing severe bodily injury. Although this three-year-old child was the victim of a horrible and disgusting crime, I respectfully dissent from the portion finding sufficient evidence to convict Brown of aiding murder.
The majority does not address what seems to me to be a critical gap in the State's evidence. Brown was charged with being an accomplice to murder. Accordingly, as the majority opinion reflects, if there was a murder in the facts, it is the blow Lee struck, not the subsequent events as to which Brown was a principal, not an accomplice. I cannot find evidence that supports the notion that Brown either "knowingly" or "intentionally" assisted Lee in causing MicKenzie's death. Accomplice liability requires a person "knowingly and intentionally" aid the principal. Ind. Code *283 § 35-41-24 (1998). This requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that either (1) Brown knew Lee was about to deliver a fatal blow or (2) Brown intended to encourage Lee to kill the child.
In most crimes, the acts of assistance also supply awareness of the principal's purpose to commit the crime. Here, however, all Brown did was tell Lee he was "going to easy" on the victim and fail to intervene in Lee's clearly expressed intent to punish the child. I eannot infer from this evidence that at the time immediately before the fatal blow was struck by Lee, Brown had any basis to conclude that death would result. Certainly, I cannot find evidence of her knowledge of a high degree of probability that death would result or a "conscious objective" that the child be killed. LC. § 85-41-2-2. To be sure, Brown's actions after the fatal blow was delivered fully support the neglect of a dependent conviction. I would affirm the conviction of neglect of a dependent, reverse the murder conviction, and impose the trial court's maximum sentence of twenty years.