concluding that the trial court did not clearly err by determining that the defendant had not suffered prejudice to his defense, particularly because “the record contains no specific proof of such prejudice”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the trial court did not clearly err by determining that the defendant had not suffered prejudice to his defense, particularly because “the record contains no specific proof of such prejudice”
- finding no clear error in the trial court’s finding that the defendant was responsible for a delay when newly-appointed successor defense counsel needed to familiarize himself with the defendant’s case
- finding no error where the trial court attributed months of delay to the defendant because defense counsel failed to appear twice and the defendant’s newly appointed counsel “had to familiarize himself with the case.”
- holding that MCL 780.131(1) expressly provides that notice must be sent from the Department of Corrections to the prosecuting attorney to trigger the 180-day rule
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CAVANAGH, J.
(concurring in the result only). I concur with the result reached by the majority to overrule People v Smith, 438 Mich 715 ; 475 NW2d 333 (1991), and its progeny because these cases are inconsistent with the plain language of MCL 780.131, the 180-day-rule statute. The statute contains no exception for charges subject to consecutive sentencing. Moreover, while I agree with the majority that, under the facts of this case, there was not a violation of the 180-day-rule statute or defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, if defendant is ultimately convicted, I urge the *266 trial court to consider the delay in bringing defendant to trial when imposing defendant’s sentence. If convicted, the delay in prosecuting defendant will in fact delay the start of defendant’s minimum sentence.
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.