holding that the Florida Supreme Court reasonably applied Strickland by concluding that the petitioner suffered no prejudice when the mitigating evidence presented in the state post-conviction proceeding could open the door to additional damning evidence
How later courts described this case
- holding that the Florida Supreme Court reasonably applied Strickland by concluding that the petitioner suffered no prejudice when the mitigating evidence presented in the state post-conviction proceeding could open the door to additional damning evidence
- stating that Porter is an application of Strickland and does not alter the ordinary rule that courts “ ‘must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury’ ” (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 695 (III) (B))
- affirming the denial of habeas relief in a capital case because it is not “reasonably probable that a different outcome would have resulted if the government had disclosed” impeachment evidence
- explaining that the existence of item-by-item analysis is not inconsistent with a cumulative analysis
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result:
I reach the same result as Judge Pryor has done: affirm the district court’s decision to deny habeas relief.
In my view, given the deferential standard commanded by AEDPA, no relief can be correctly given by us in this case. The pertinent state decision reasonably determined the facts and neither contradicted nor unreasonably applied the then clearly established federal law, in the light of the actual holdings made by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States— even considering later decisions (such as, the decision for prejudice in the Porter case). I believe the lack of prejudice, right through, is a particularly strong point for *1303 Florida — given the evidence in this case and the deference required by AEDPA.