concluding that the group of plaintiff petroleum refiners and importers had not demonstrated standing to challenge the agency’s approval of the use of a particular gasoline- ethanol blend because “the only real effect of [the agency’s action] is to provide fuel manufacturers the option to introduce [the] new fuel[ and t]o the extent the petroleum group’s members implement that option voluntarily, any injury they incur as a result is a ‘self-inflicted harm’ not fairly traceable to the challenged government conduct”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the group of plaintiff petroleum refiners and importers had not demonstrated standing to challenge the agency’s approval of the use of a particular gasoline- ethanol blend because “the only real effect of [the agency’s action] is to provide fuel manufacturers the option to introduce [the] new fuel[ and t]o the extent the petroleum group’s members implement that option voluntarily, any injury they incur as a result is a ‘self-inflicted harm’ not fairly traceable to the challenged government conduct”
- explaining that the government’s “action” did “not force, require, or even encourage” plaintiffs to bring new fuels to the market, and “[t]o the extent the petroleum group’s members implement that option voluntarily, any injury they incur as a result is a self-inflicted harm not fairly traceable to the challenged government conduct” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
- explaining that, if a fuel manufacturer chose to meet its renewable fuel requirements by introducing the contested new fuel over another type of fuel due to cost considerations, that choice to incur potential injury would be “grounded in economics” and “most certainly not” caused by the challenged EPA waivers
- concluding that standing was not self-evident where the challenged “decisions [did] not on their face directly impose regulatory restrictions, costs, or other burdens” on petitioners
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TATEL, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the dissent that the food group has Article III standing. See Dissenting Op. at 182-83. I also agree with those circuits that have held that prudential standing is non-jurisdictional. See id. at 184-85 (collecting cases). This Circuit, however, has directly held to the contrary. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 697 (D.C.Cir.1994) (“Prudential standing is of course, like Article III standing, a jurisdictional concept.”); Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720 , 723 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1994) (“Standing, whether constitutional or prudential, is a jurisdictional issue which cannot be waived or conceded.”). True, passing statements by subsequent panels may be in some tension with these earlier decisions, see Dissenting Op. at 185 n. 4 (collecting cases), and in recent years the Supreme Court has certainly criticized lower courts for overusing the “jurisdictional” label, see id. at 183-84 (collecting cases). But taken in context these cases are “too thin a reed,” id. at 184-85, to permit this panel to depart from our clear prior holdings that prudential standing is jurisdictional — no matter how much we may think those decisions are wrong or that the Supreme Court may be preparing to hold otherwise. See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C.Cir.2009) (“A panel of this court ... must adhere to the law of our circuit unless that law conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court.” (citing LaShawn A v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 (D.C.Cir.1996) (en banc))); United States v. Williams, 194 F.3d 100, 107 (D.C.Cir.1999) (circuit precedent binding unless “eviscerat[ed]” by subsequent Supreme Court decisions), abrogated on other grounds by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).