holding, in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 context, that when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks “some defect in the integrity of * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 04-41253 -2- the federal habeas proceedings,” such as alleging that the district court misapplied the statute of limitations, the motion is not the equivalent of a successive habeas application and should not be construed as such
How later courts described this case
- holding, in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 context, that when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks “some defect in the integrity of * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 04-41253 -2- the federal habeas proceedings,” such as alleging that the district court misapplied the statute of limitations, the motion is not the equivalent of a successive habeas application and should not be construed as such
- explaining that a Rule 60(b) motion should be treated as a second or successive habeas petition “if it attacks the federal court's previous resolution of a claim on the merits, since alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the [habeas corpus] statutes, entitled to habeas relief” (emphasis in original; footnote omitted)
- holding the district court correctly denied relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to a habeas petitioner based on a Supreme Court decision that was made after judgment; reasoning that the petitioner’s lack of diligence in pursuing the issue on appeal “confirms that [the Supreme Court decision] is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief from the judgment in petitioner’s case”
- explaining that petitioner advances habeas claims in Rule 60(b) motion if they “attack[] the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits, since alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by Armando Albo v. United States, 498 F. App'x 490 (2012)
Although the Court in Gonzalez limited its holding to petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, this court in In re Nailor, 487 F.3d 1018, 1022-23 (6th Cir.2007), held that the Court's rationale applied to motions made pursuant to § 2255.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Harris v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 2d 199 (2007)
545 U.S. 524, 530 n. 3, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005) (holding that Rule 60(b) is inapplicable because it would undermine the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 restrictions on habeas petitions from state convictions, and noting that the same logic may apply to motions for relief from sentences imposed by federal courts under § 2255);
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
concurring.
The majority explains that a proper Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion “attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Ante, at 532. This is consistent with Judge Tjofiat’s description of the standard in his opinion below, see 366 F. 3d 1253, 1297 (CA11 2004) (specially concurring in part and dissenting in part), and I agree with it. I fear that other language in the majority’s opinion, especially its discussion of the significance of the word “claim,” could be taken to imply a different *539 standard, with which I would disagree. With that qualification, I join the majority’s opinion.