Gonzalez v. Crosby

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GONZALEZ v. CROSBY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DE-

PARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–6432. Argued April 25, 2005—Decided June 23, 2005

Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition was dismissed as time

barred when the District Court concluded that the federal limitations

period was not tolled while petitioner’s motion for postconviction re-

lief was pending in state court. After petitioner abandoned his at-

tempt to seek review of the District Court’s decision, this Court de-

cided that a state postconviction relief petition can toll the federal

statute of limitations even if, like petitioner’s, the petition is ulti-

mately dismissed as procedurally barred. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S.

4. Petitioner filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion

for relief from the judgment, which the District Court denied. The

Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the Rule 60(b) mo-

tion was in substance a second or successive habeas petition, which

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2244(b), cannot be filed without precertifica-

tion by the court of appeals.

Held:

1. Because petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion challenged only the Dis-

trict Court’s previous ruling on AEDPA’s statute of limitations, it is

not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition and can be ruled

upon by the District Court without precertification by the Eleventh

Circuit. Pp. 3–11.

(a) Rule 60(b) applies in §2254 habeas proceedings only “to the

extent that [it is] not inconsistent with” applicable federal statutes

and rules. §2254 Rule 11. Because §2244(b) applies only where a

court acts pursuant to a prisoner’s “habeas corpus application,” the

question here is whether a Rule 60(b) motion is such an application.

The text of §2244(b) shows that, for these purposes, a habeas applica-

2 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY

Syllabus

tion is a filing containing one or more “claims.” Other federal habeas

statutes and this Court’s decisions also make clear that a “claim” is

an asserted federal basis for relief from a state-court conviction. If a

Rule 60(b) motion contains one or more “claims,” the motion is, if not

in substance a “habeas corpus application,” at least similar enough

that failing to subject it to AEDPA’s restrictions on successive habeas

petitions would be “inconsistent with” the statute. A Rule 60(b) mo-

tion can be said to bring a “claim” if it seeks to add a new ground for

relief from the state conviction or attacks the federal court’s previous

resolution of a claim on the merits, though not if it merely attacks a

defect in the federal habeas proceedings’ integrity. Pp. 3–8.

(b) When no “claim” is presented, there is no basis for contending

that a Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a habeas petition. If

neither the motion itself nor the federal judgment from which it seeks

relief substantively addresses federal grounds for setting aside the

movant’s state conviction, allowing the motion to proceed on its own

terms creates no inconsistency with the habeas statute or rules. Pe-

titioner’s motion, which alleges that the federal courts misapplied

§2244(d)’s statute of limitations, fits this description. Nothing in

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, suggests that entertaining a

filing confined to a nonmerits aspect of the first federal habeas pro-

ceeding is “inconsistent with” AEDPA. Pp. 8–11.

2. Under the proper Rule 60(b) standards, the District Court was

correct to deny relief. The change in the law worked by Artuz is not

an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6),

and it is made all the less extraordinary by the lack of diligence that

petitioner showed in seeking direct appellate review of the statute-of-

limitations issue. Pp. 11–13.

366 F. 3d 1253, affirmed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST,

C. J., and O’CONNOR, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ.,

joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS, J., filed a dis-

senting opinion, in which SOUTER, J., joined.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–6432

_________________

AURELIO O. GONZALEZ, PETITIONER v. JAMES V.

CROSBY, JR., SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2005]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

After the federal courts denied petitioner habeas corpus

relief from his state conviction, he filed a motion for relief

from that judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b). The question presented is whether, in a

habeas case, such motions are subject to the additional

restrictions that apply to “second or successive” habeas

corpus petitions under the provisions of the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) codified

at 28 U. S. C. §2244(b).

I

Petitioner Aurelio Gonzalez pleaded guilty in Florida

Circuit Court to one count of robbery with a firearm. He

filed no appeal and began serving his 99-year sentence in

1982. Some 12 years later, petitioner began to seek relief

from his conviction. He filed two motions for state post-

conviction relief, which the Florida courts denied. There-

after, in June 1997, petitioner filed a federal habeas peti-

tion in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida, alleging that his guilty plea had not

2 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY

Opinion of the Court

been entered knowingly and voluntarily.

Upon the State’s motion, the District Court dismissed

petitioner’s habeas petition as barred by AEDPA’s statute

of limitations, 28 U. S. C. §2244(d). Under Eleventh Cir-

cuit precedent, petitioner’s filing deadline, absent tolling,

was April 23, 1997, one year after AEDPA’s statute of

limitations took effect. Wilcox v. Florida Dept. of Correc-

tions, 158 F. 3d 1209, 1211 (CA11 1998) (per curiam).

Adopting a Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the Dis-

trict Court concluded that the limitations period was not

tolled during the 163-day period while petitioner’s second

motion for state postconviction relief was pending. Section

2244(d)(2) tolls the statute of limitations during the pend-

ency of “properly filed” applications only, and the District

Court thought petitioner’s motion was not “properly filed”

because it was both untimely and successive. Without

tolling, petitioner’s federal habeas petition was two

months late, so the District Court dismissed it as time

barred. A judge of the Eleventh Circuit denied a certifi-

cate of appealability (COA) on April 6, 2000, and peti-

tioner did not file for rehearing or review of that decision.

On November 7, 2000, we held in Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U. S. 4, that an application for state postconviction relief

can be “properly filed” even if the state courts dismiss it as

procedurally barred. See id., at 8–9. Almost nine months

later, petitioner filed in the District Court a pro se “Motion

to Amend or Alter Judgment,” contending that the District

Court’s time-bar ruling was incorrect under Artuz’s con-

struction of §2244(d), and invoking Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(6), which permits a court to relieve a

party from the effect of a final judgment.1 The District

——————

1 Althoughthe title “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment” suggests

that petitioner was relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the

substance of the motion made clear that petitioner sought relief under

Rule 60(b)(6).

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Opinion of the Court

Court denied the motion, and petitioner appealed.

A judge of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

granted petitioner a COA, but a panel quashed the certifi-

cate as improvidently granted. 317 F. 3d 1308, 1310, 1314

(2003). The full court vacated that order and reheard the

case en banc. It granted petitioner a COA but held, by a

vote of 7 to 4, that the District Court was correct to deny

his Rule 60(b) motion. The en banc majority determined

that petitioner’s motion—indeed, any postjudgment mo-

tion under Rule 60(b) save one alleging fraud on the court

under Rule 60(b)(3)—was in substance a second or succes-

sive habeas corpus petition. 366 F. 3d 1253, 1278, 1281–

1282 (2004). A state prisoner may not file such a petition

without precertification by the court of appeals that the

petition meets certain stringent criteria. §2244(b). Be-

cause petitioner’s motion did not satisfy these require-

ments, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed its denial. Id., at

1282.

We granted certiorari. 543 U. S. __ (2005).

II

Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final

judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a

limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and

newly discovered evidence.2 Rule 60(b)(6), the particular

——————

2 Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part:

“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a

party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following

reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)

newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud

. . . , misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the

judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or

discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been re-

versed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judg-

ment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall

4 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY

Opinion of the Court

provision under which petitioner brought his motion,

permits reopening when the movant shows “any . . . rea-

son justifying relief from the operation of the judgment”

other than the more specific circumstances set out in

Rules 60(b)(1)–(5). See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisi-

tion Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 863, n. 11 (1988); Klapprott v.

United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613 (1949) (opinion of Black,

J.). The mere recitation of these provisions shows why we

give little weight to respondent’s appeal to the virtues of

finality. That policy consideration, standing alone, is un-

persuasive in the interpretation of a provision whose

whole purpose is to make an exception to finality. The

issue here is whether the text of Rule 60(b) itself, or of

some other provision of law, limits its application in a

manner relevant to the case before us.

AEDPA did not expressly circumscribe the operation of

Rule 60(b). (By contrast, AEDPA directly amended other

provisions of the Federal Rules. See, e.g., AEDPA, §103,

110 Stat. 1218 (amending Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22).) The

new habeas restrictions introduced by AEDPA are made

indirectly relevant, however, by the fact that Rule 60(b),

like the rest of the Rules of Civil Procedure, applies in

habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U. S. C. §22543 only

“to the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with” applicable

federal statutory provisions and rules. 28 U. S. C. §2254

Rule 11; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2). The relevant

——————

be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not

more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was

entered or taken.”

3 In this case we consider only the extent to which Rule 60(b) applies

to habeas proceedings under 28 U. S. C. §2254, which governs federal

habeas relief for prisoners convicted in state court. Federal prisoners

generally seek postconviction relief under §2255, which contains its

own provision governing second or successive applications. Although

that portion of §2255 is similar to, and refers to, the statutory subsec-

tion applicable to second or successive §2254 petitions, it is not identi-

cal. Accordingly, we limit our consideration to §2254 cases.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5

Opinion of the Court

provisions of the AEDPA-amended habeas statutes, 28

U. S. C. §§2244(b)(1)–(3), impose three requirements on

second or successive habeas petitions: First, any claim

that has already been adjudicated in a previous petition

must be dismissed. §2244(b)(1). Second, any claim that

has not already been adjudicated must be dismissed

unless it relies on either a new and retroactive rule of

constitutional law or new facts showing a high probability

of actual innocence. §2244(b)(2). Third, before the district

court may accept a successive petition for filing, the court

of appeals must determine that it presents a claim not

previously raised that is sufficient to meet §2244(b)(2)’s

new-rule or actual-innocence provisions. §2244(b)(3). We

proceed to consider whether these provisions limit the

application of Rule 60(b) to the present case.

A

“As a textual matter, §2244(b) applies only where the

court acts pursuant to a prisoner’s ‘application’ ” for a writ

of habeas corpus. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538,

554 (1998). We therefore must decide whether a Rule 60(b)

motion filed by a habeas petitioner is a “habeas corpus

application” as the statute uses that term.

Under §2244(b), the first step of analysis is to determine

whether a “claim presented in a second or successive

habeas corpus application” was also “presented in a prior

application.” If so, the claim must be dismissed; if not, the

analysis proceeds to whether the claim satisfies one of two

narrow exceptions. In either event, it is clear that for

purposes of §2244(b) an “application” for habeas relief is a

filing that contains one or more “claims.” That definition

is consistent with the use of the term “application” in the

other habeas statutes in chapter 153 of title 28. See, e.g.,

Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U. S. 202, 207 (2003) (for pur-

poses of §2254(d), an application for habeas corpus relief is

a filing that seeks “an adjudication on the merits of the

6 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY

Opinion of the Court

petitioner’s claims”). These statutes, and our own deci-

sions, make clear that a “claim” as used in §2244(b) is an

asserted federal basis for relief from a state court’s judg-

ment of conviction.

In some instances, a Rule 60(b) motion will contain one

or more “claims.” For example, it might straightforwardly

assert that owing to “excusable neglect,” Fed. Rule Civ.

Proc. 60(b)(1), the movant’s habeas petition had omitted a

claim of constitutional error, and seek leave to present

that claim. Cf. Harris v. United States, 367 F. 3d 74, 80–

81 (CA2 2004) (petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion sought relief

from judgment because habeas counsel had failed to raise

a Sixth Amendment claim). Similarly, a motion might

seek leave to present “newly discovered evidence,” Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(2), in support of a claim previously

denied. E.g., Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F. 3d 66, 69 (CA1 2003).

Or a motion might contend that a subsequent change in

substantive law is a “reason justifying relief,” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6), from the previous denial of a claim.

E.g., Dunlap v. Litscher, 301 F. 3d 873, 876 (CA7 2002).

Virtually every Court of Appeals to consider the question

has held that such a pleading, although labeled a Rule

60(b) motion, is in substance a successive habeas petition

and should be treated accordingly. E.g., Rodwell, supra,

at 71–72; Dunlap, supra, at 876.

We think those holdings are correct. A habeas peti-

tioner’s filing that seeks vindication of such a claim is, if

not in substance a “habeas corpus application,” at least

similar enough that failing to subject it to the same re-

quirements would be “inconsistent with” the statute. 28

U. S. C. §2254 Rule 11. Using Rule 60(b) to present new

claims for relief from a state court’s judgment of convic-

tion—even claims couched in the language of a true Rule

60(b) motion—circumvents AEDPA’s requirement that a

new claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new

rule of constitutional law or newly discovered facts.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7

Opinion of the Court

§2244(b)(2). The same is true of a Rule 60(b)(2) motion

presenting new evidence in support of a claim already

litigated: even assuming that reliance on a new factual

predicate causes that motion to escape §2244(b)(1)’s prohi-

bition of claims “presented in a prior application,”

§2244(b)(2)(B) requires a more convincing factual showing

than does Rule 60(b). Likewise, a Rule 60(b) motion based

on a purported change in the substantive law governing

the claim could be used to circumvent §2244(b)(2)(A)’s

dictate that the only new law on which a successive peti-

tion may rely is “a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme

Court, that was previously unavailable.” In addition to

the substantive conflict with AEDPA standards, in each of

these three examples use of Rule 60(b) would impermissi-

bly circumvent the requirement that a successive habeas

petition be precertified by the court of appeals as falling

within an exception to the successive-petition bar.

§2244(b)(3).

In most cases, determining whether a Rule 60(b) motion

advances one or more “claims” will be relatively simple. A

motion that seeks to add a new ground for relief, as in

Harris, supra, will of course qualify. A motion can also be

said to bring a “claim” if it attacks the federal court’s

previous resolution of a claim on the merits,4 since alleging

that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits

is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the

——————

4 The term “on the merits” has multiple usages. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l

Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U. S. 497, 501–503 (2001). We refer

here to a determination that there exist or do not exist grounds enti-

tling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief under 28 U. S. C. §§2254(a)

and (d). When a movant asserts one of those grounds (or asserts that a

previous ruling regarding one of those grounds was in error) he is

making a habeas corpus claim. He is not doing so when he merely

asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination

was in error—for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to

exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar.

8 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY

Opinion of the Court

movant is, under the substantive provisions of the stat-

utes, entitled to habeas relief. That is not the case, how-

ever, when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the substance

of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits,

but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas

proceedings.5

B

When no “claim” is presented, there is no basis for con-

tending that the Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a

habeas corpus application. If neither the motion itself nor

the federal judgment from which it seeks relief substan-

tively addresses federal grounds for setting aside the

movant’s state conviction, allowing the motion to proceed

as denominated creates no inconsistency with the habeas

statute or rules. Petitioner’s motion in the present case,

which alleges that the federal courts misapplied the fed-

eral statute of limitations set out in §2244(d), fits this

description.6

——————

5 Fraud on the federal habeas court is one example of such a defect.

See generally Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F. 3d 191, 199 (CA2 2001) (a

witness’s allegedly fraudulent basis for refusing to appear at a federal

habeas hearing “relate[d] to the integrity of the federal habeas proceed-

ing, not to the integrity of the state criminal trial”). We note that an

attack based on the movant’s own conduct, or his habeas counsel’s

omissions, see, e.g., supra, at 6, ordinarily does not go to the integrity of

the proceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to have the

merits determined favorably.

6 Petitioner notes that we held in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473

(2000), that when a petition is dismissed without prejudice as unex-

hausted, the refiled petition is not “successive.” He argues that, by

parity of reasoning, his Rule 60(b) motion challenging the District

Court dismissal of his petition on statute-of-limitations grounds is not

“successive.” If this argument is correct, petitioner would be able to file

not just a Rule 60(b) motion, but a full-blown habeas petition, without

running afoul of §2244(b). But see, e.g., Murray v. Greiner, 394 F. 3d

78, 81 (CA2 2005). We need not consider this contention, however,

because we conclude that petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion is not subject to

the limitations applicable to habeas petitions.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9

Opinion of the Court

Like the Court of Appeals, respondent relies heavily on

our decision in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538

(1998). In that case we reversed the Ninth Circuit’s deci-

sion to recall its mandate and reconsider the denial of

Thompson’s first federal habeas petition; the recall was,

we held, an abuse of discretion because of its inconsistency

with the policies embodied in AEDPA. Id., at 554–559.

Analogizing an appellate court’s recall of its mandate to a

district court’s grant of relief from judgment, the Eleventh

Circuit thought that Calderon’s disposition applied to Rule

60(b). 366 F. 3d, at 1272–1277. We think otherwise. To

begin with, as the opinion said, compliance with the actual

text of AEDPA’s successive-petition provision was not at

issue in Calderon—because the Court of Appeals consid-

ered only the claims and evidence presented in Thomp-

son’s first federal habeas petition. 523 U. S., at 554.

Calderon did state, however, that “a prisoner’s motion to

recall the mandate on the basis of the merits of the under-

lying decision can be regarded as a second or successive

application.” Id., at 553 (emphasis added). But that is

entirely consonant with the proposition that a Rule 60(b)

motion that seeks to revisit the federal court’s denial on

the merits of a claim for relief should be treated as a suc-

cessive habeas petition. The problem for respondent is

that this case does not present a revisitation of the merits.

The motion here, like some other Rule 60(b) motions in

§2254 cases, confines itself not only to the first federal

habeas petition, but to a nonmerits aspect of the first

federal habeas proceeding. Nothing in Calderon suggests

that entertaining such a filing is “inconsistent with”

AEDPA.

Rule 60(b) has an unquestionably valid role to play in

habeas cases. The Rule is often used to relieve parties

from the effect of a default judgment mistakenly entered

against them, e.g., Klapprott, 335 U. S., at 615 (opinion of

Black, J.), a function as legitimate in habeas cases as in

10 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY

Opinion of the Court

run-of-the-mine civil cases. The Rule also preserves par-

ties’ opportunity to obtain vacatur of a judgment that is

void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—a considera-

tion just as valid in habeas cases as in any other, since

absence of jurisdiction altogether deprives a federal court

of the power to adjudicate the rights of the parties. Steel

Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94, 101

(1998). In some instances, we may note, it is the State, not

the habeas petitioner, that seeks to use Rule 60(b), to

reopen a habeas judgment granting the writ. See, e.g.,

Ritter v. Smith, 811 F. 2d 1398, 1400 (CA11 1987).

Moreover, several characteristics of a Rule 60(b) motion

limit the friction between the Rule and the successive-

petition prohibitions of AEDPA, ensuring that our har-

monization of the two will not expose federal courts to an

avalanche of frivolous postjudgment motions. First, Rule

60(b) contains its own limitations, such as the require-

ment that the motion “be made within a reasonable time”

and the more specific 1-year deadline for asserting three of

the most open-ended grounds of relief (excusable neglect,

newly discovered evidence, and fraud). Second, our cases

have required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6)

to show “extraordinary circumstances” justifying the

reopening of a final judgment. Ackermann v. United

States, 340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950); accord, id., at 202; Lilje-

berg, 486 U. S., at 864; id., at 873 (REHNQUIST, C. J., dis-

senting) (“This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is

essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved”).

Such circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas context.

Third, Rule 60(b) proceedings are subject to only limited and

deferential appellate review. Browder v. Director, Dept. of

Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 263, n. 7 (1978). Many

Courts of Appeals have construed 28 U. S. C. §2253 to

impose an additional limitation on appellate review by

requiring a habeas petitioner to obtain a COA as a pre-

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 11

Opinion of the Court

requisite to appealing the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion.7

Because petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion challenges only

the District Court’s previous ruling on the AEDPA statute

of limitations, it is not the equivalent of a successive ha-

beas petition. The Eleventh Circuit therefore erred in

holding that petitioner did not qualify even to seek Rule

60(b) relief.

III

Although the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is inconsis-

tent with our holding today, we nonetheless affirm its

denial of petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion.

Petitioner’s only ground for reopening the judgment

denying his first federal habeas petition is that our deci-

sion in Artuz showed the error of the District Court’s

statute-of-limitations ruling. We assume for present

purposes that the District Court’s ruling was incorrect.8

As we noted above, however, relief under Rule 60(b)(6)—

the only subsection petitioner invokes—requires a show-

ing of “extraordinary circumstances.” Petitioner contends

that Artuz’s change in the interpretation of the AEDPA

——————

7 See Reid v. Angelone, 369 F. 3d 363, 369, n. 2 (CA4 2004) (citing

cases); 366 F. 3d 1253, 1263 (CA11 2004) (case below); cf. Langford v.

Day, 134 F. 3d 1381, 1382 (CA9 1998) (before AEDPA, a certificate of

probable cause was a prerequisite to appealing the denial of a 60(b)

motion in a habeas case); Reid, supra, at 368 (same). But see Dunn v.

Cockrell, 302 F. 3d 491, 492 (CA5 2002); 366 F. 3d, at 1298–1300

(Tjoflat, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). Al-

though we do not decide in this case whether this construction of §2253

is correct (the Eleventh Circuit granted petitioner a COA), the COA

requirement appears to be a more plausible and effective screening

requirement, with sounder basis in the statute, than the near-absolute

bar imposed here by the Court of Appeals.

8 Although respondent contends that petitioner’s motion for state

postconviction relief was untimely, and that the District Court’s denial

of statutory tolling was therefore correct under Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U. S. __ (2005), the Florida courts made no reference to untimeli-

ness in dismissing petitioner’s motion.

12 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY

Opinion of the Court

statute of limitations meets this description. We do not

agree. The District Court’s interpretation was by all

appearances correct under the Eleventh Circuit’s then-

prevailing interpretation of 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2). It is

hardly extraordinary that subsequently, after petitioner’s

case was no longer pending, this Court arrived at a differ-

ent interpretation. Although our constructions of federal

statutes customarily apply to all cases then pending on

direct review, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxa-

tion, 509 U. S. 86, 97 (1993), not every interpretation of the

federal statutes setting forth the requirements for habeas

provides cause for reopening cases long since final.9 If

Artuz justified reopening long-ago dismissals based on a

lower court’s unduly parsimonious interpretation of

§2244(d)(2), then Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. __ (2005),

would justify reopening long-ago grants of habeas relief

based on a lower court’s unduly generous interpretation of

the same tolling provision.

The change in the law worked by Artuz is all the less

extraordinary in petitioner’s case, because of his lack of

diligence in pursuing review of the statute-of-limitations

issue. At the time Artuz was decided, petitioner had

abandoned any attempt to seek review of the District

Court’s decision on this statute-of-limitations issue. Al-

though the District Court relied on Eleventh Circuit

precedent holding that a state postconviction application

is not “properly filed” if it is procedurally defaulted, and

although that precedent was at odds with the rule in

several other Circuits, petitioner neither raised that issue

in his application for a COA, nor filed a petition for re-

hearing of the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of a COA, nor

——————

9 A change in the interpretation of a substantive statute may have

consequences for cases that have already reached final judgment,

particularly in the criminal context. See Bousley v. United States, 523

U. S. 614, 619–621 (1998); cf. Fiore v. White, 531 U. S. 225, 228–229

(2001) (per curiam).

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 13

Opinion of the Court

sought certiorari review of that denial.10 This lack of

diligence confirms that Artuz is not an extraordinary

circumstance justifying relief from the judgment in peti-

tioner’s case. Indeed, in one of the cases in which we

explained Rule 60(b)(6)’s extraordinary-circumstances

requirement, the movant had failed to appeal an adverse

ruling by the District Court, whereas another party to the

same judgment had appealed and won reversal. Acker-

mann, 340 U. S., at 195. Some years later, the petitioner

sought Rule 60(b) relief, which the District Court denied.

We affirmed the denial of Rule 60(b) relief, noting that the

movant’s decision not to appeal had been free and volun-

tary, although the favorable ruling in the companion case

made it appear mistaken in hindsight. See id., at 198.

Under the Rule 60(b) standards that properly govern

petitioner’s motion, the District Court was correct to deny

relief.

* * *

We hold that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a §2254 case is

not to be treated as a successive habeas petition if it does

not assert, or reassert, claims of error in the movant’s

state conviction. A motion that, like petitioner’s, chal-

lenges only the District Court’s failure to reach the merits

does not warrant such treatment, and can therefore be

——————

10 We granted review to resolve the conflict over the interpretation of

“properly filed” on April 17, 2000, only eight days after the Eleventh

Circuit denied petitioner a COA and well within the 90-day period in

which petitioner could have sought certiorari. Artuz v. Bennett, 529

U. S. 1065. Whether or not petitioner was aware that the issue was

pending before us, see post, at 7, n. 7 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), it is

indisputable that had he but filed a petition raising the statute-of-

limitations argument he now advances, we would surely have granted

him the reconsideration in light of Artuz that he later sought in his Rule

60(b) motion. See, e.g., Brown v. Moore, 532 U. S. 968 (2001) (granting a

pro se petition for certiorari, vacating the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment

denying a COA, and remanding for reconsideration in light of Artuz).

14 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY

Opinion of the Court

ruled upon by the District Court without precertification

by the Court of Appeals pursuant to §2244(b)(3). In this

case, however, petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion fails to set

forth an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief.

For that reason, we affirm the judgment of the Court of

Appeals.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

BREYER, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–6432

_________________

AURELIO O. GONZALEZ, PETITIONER v. JAMES V.

CROSBY, JR., SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2005]

JUSTICE BREYER, concurring.

The majority explains that a proper Rule 60(b) motion

“attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution

of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of

the federal habeas proceedings.” Ante, at 8. This is con-

sistent with Judge Tjoflat’s description of the standard in

his opinion below, see 366 F. 3d 1253, 1297 (CA11 2004)

(specially concurring in part and dissenting in part), and I

agree with it. I fear that other language in the majority’s

opinion, especially its discussion of the significance of the

word “claim,” could be taken to imply a different standard,

with which I would disagree. With that qualification, I

join the majority’s opinion.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–6432

_________________

AURELIO O. GONZALEZ, PETITIONER v. JAMES V.

CROSBY, JR., SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2005]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins,

dissenting.

The most significant aspect of today’s decision is the

Court’s unanimous rejection of the view that all postjudg-

ment motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)

except those alleging fraud under Rule 60(b)(3) should be

treated as second or successive habeas corpus petitions.

Not only do I agree with that holding, I believe that we

should have more promptly made clear that the Antiter-

rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

and Rule 60(b) can coexist in harmony. See Ab-

dur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U. S. 88, 90 (2002) (STEVENS, J.,

dissenting from dismissal of certiorari as improvidently

granted).

As the Court recognizes, whether a Rule 60(b) motion

may proceed in the habeas context depends on the nature

of the relief the motion seeks. See ante, at 8.1 Given the

——————

1 Under the First Circuit’s useful formulation, which was invoked by

Judge Tjoflat’s dissenting opinion below, “[w]hen the motions’ factual

predicate deals primarily with the constitutionality of the underlying

state conviction or sentence, then the motion should be treated as a

second or successive habeas petition. This situation should be distin-

guished from one in which the motion’s factual predicate deals primar-

ily with some irregularity or procedural defect in the procurement of

2 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY

STEVENS, J., dissenting

substance of petitioner’s motion, I agree with the Court

that this was a “true” Rule 60(b) motion and that the

District Court and the Court of Appeals therefore erred in

treating it as a successive habeas petition. And while I

also agree with much of the Court’s reasoning in Parts I

and II of its opinion, I believe the Court goes too far in

commenting on issues that are not directly before us and

that have not been fully briefed. See, e.g., ante, at 6–7

(discussing various court of appeals cases). My main

disagreement, however, pertains to Part III of the Court’s

opinion.

The Court reaches beyond the question on which we

granted certiorari (whether petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion

should be treated as a successive habeas petition) and

adjudicates the merits of that motion. In my judgment,

however, “correct procedure requires that the merits of the

Rule 60(b) motion be addressed in the first instance by the

District Court.” Abdur’Rahman, 537 U. S., at 97

(STEVENS, J., dissenting). A district court considering a

Rule 60(b) motion will often take into account a variety of

factors in addition to the specific ground given for reopen-

ing the judgment. These factors include the diligence of

the movant, the probable merit of the movant’s underlying

claims, the opposing party’s reliance interests in the final-

ity of the judgment, and other equitable considerations.

See 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice

and Procedure §2857 (2d ed. 1995 and Supp. 2004) see

ibid. (noting that appellate courts will reverse a district

court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion); Plaut v.

Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 233–234 (1995)

(Rule 60(b) “reflects and confirms the courts’ own inherent

——————

the judgment denying relief. That is the classic function of a Rule 60(b)

motion, and such a motion should be treated within the usual confines

of Rule 60(b).” Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F. 3d 66, 70 (2003) (citation omit-

ted); see also 366 F. 3d 1253, 1297 (CA 11 2004) (Tjoflat, J., opinion

concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

STEVENS, J., dissenting

and discretionary power, ‘firmly established in English

practice long before the foundation of our Republic,’ to set

aside a judgment whose enforcement would work inequity”

(citation omitted)). In light of the equitable, often fact-

intensive nature of the Rule 60(b) inquiry, it is inappro-

priate for an appellate court to undertake it in the first

instance. This is especially so in this case, in which both

the briefing and the record before us are insufficient with

regard to the merits issue.

Orderly procedure aside, the Court’s truncated analysis

is unsatisfactory. At least in some circumstances, a su-

pervening change in AEDPA procedural law can be the

kind of “extraordinary circumstanc[e],” Ackermann v.

United States, 340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950), that constitutes a

“reason justifying relief from the operation of the judg-

ment” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(6). In this case,

the District Court dismissed petitioner’s habeas petition

as time barred after concluding that his second motion for

state postconviction relief did not toll AEDPA’s statute of

limitations. See 28 U. S. C. §2244(d). After that judgment

became final, however, we decided Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U. S. 4 (2000), which made clear that the District Court’s

ruling on tolling was erroneous and that the habeas peti-

tion should therefore not have been dismissed.2

Unfortunately, the Court underestimates the signifi-

cance of the fact that petitioner was effectively shut out of

federal court—without any adjudication of the merits of

his claims—because of a procedural ruling that was later

shown to be flatly mistaken. As we have stressed,

“[d]ismissal of a first federal habeas petition is a particu-

larly serious matter, for that dismissal denies the peti-

——————

2 Although the State contests this point in a footnote, see Brief for

Respondent 40–41, n. 33, the Court rightly assumes that the District

Court’s decision was incorrect. See ante, at 11, and n. 8. If any doubt

remains, it should be resolved by the District Court in the first

instance.

4 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY

STEVENS, J., dissenting

tioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely, risking

injury to an important interest in human liberty.” Lon-

char v. Thomas, 517 U. S. 314, 324 (1996); see also Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 483 (2000) (“The writ of ha-

beas corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional

rights”). When a habeas petition has been dismissed on a

clearly defective procedural ground, the State can hardly

claim a legitimate interest in the finality of that judgment.

Indeed, the State has experienced a windfall, while the

state prisoner has been deprived—contrary to congres-

sional intent—of his valuable right to one full round of

federal habeas review.

While this type of supervening change in procedural law

may not alone warrant the reopening of a habeas judg-

ment, there may be special factors that allow a prisoner to

satisfy the high standard of Rule 60(b)(6). For instance,

when a prisoner has shown reasonable diligence in seek-

ing relief based on a change in procedural law, and when

that prisoner can show that there is probable merit to his

underlying claims, it would be well in keeping with a

district court’s discretion under Rule 60(b)(6) for that court

to reopen the habeas judgment and give the prisoner the

one fair shot at habeas review that Congress intended that

he have. After all, we have consistently recognized that

Rule 60(b)(6) “provides courts with authority ‘adequate to

enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is

appropriate to accomplish justice.’ ” Liljeberg v. Health

Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 864 (1988) (quot-

ing Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 614–615

(1949)). Here, petitioner, who is serving a 99-year term in

Florida prison, filed his Rule 60(b) motion approximately

eight months after this Court’s decision in Artuz. A dis-

trict court could reasonably conclude that this period

reveals no lack of diligence on the part of an incarcerated

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5

STEVENS, J., dissenting

pro se litigant.3 And while we have received scant briefing

on the probable merit of his petition, his allegation—that

his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because it

was based on grossly inaccurate advice about the actual

time he would serve in prison—at least states a colorable

claim of a constitutional violation. See Finch v. Vaughn,

67 F. 3d 909 (CA11 1995); see also Mabry v. Johnson, 467

U. S. 504 (1984).4

The Court relies on petitioner’s supposed lack of dili-

gence in pursuing review of the District Court’s initial

statute-of-limitations ruling. See ante, at 12. In fact,

petitioner did appeal the District Court’s ruling, which the

Court of Appeals correctly interpreted as a request for a

certificate of appealability (COA).5 As for petitioner’s

——————

3 While Rule 60(b)(6) contains no specific time limitation on filing, it

is worth noting that petitioner filed his motion within the strict 1-year

limitation that applies to motions under Rules 60(b)(1)–(3).

4 It is also worth noting that Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), was

decided only seven months after petitioner’s habeas judgment became

final. In cases where significant time has elapsed between a habeas

judgment and the relevant change in procedural law, it would be within

a district court’s discretion to leave such a judgment in repose.

5 See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22(b)(2) (“If no express request for a cer-

tificate is filed, the notice of [appeal shall be deemed to constitute] a

request addressed to the judges of the court of appeals”). The proce-

dural route that petitioner navigated was actually more complicated.

After the Magistrate Judge initially recommended dismissal of the

petition as time barred, petitioner filed an objection that raised a Third

Circuit case, Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F. 3d 146 (1998), which was among

the circuit cases that was later endorsed by Artuz, 531 U. S., at 8. The

Magistrate’s final report noted that the Eleventh Circuit had not

addressed the relevant issue of tolling, and then proceeded to rely

(oddly) on Lovasz to deny petitioner’s claim. In my view, the citation to

Lovasz and the Magistrate’s acknowledgment that there was no Elev-

enth Circuit precedent on point provided a reasonable basis for the

granting of a COA.

In fact, on September 23, 1998, petitioner filed an application for a

COA, and this application was granted by the District Court. The

Court of Appeals, however, dismissed petitioner’s appeal on October 28,

6 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY

STEVENS, J., dissenting

failure to seek rehearing or certiorari, he alleged in his

Rule 60(b) motion, App. 16, and again in his reply brief,

that he filed a timely petition for rehearing on April 18,

2000, but that the clerk of the Court of Appeals returned

the motion unfiled, “explaining, erroneously, that his

appeal was dismissed and closed on October 28, 1999.”

Reply Brief for Petitioner 13 (emphasis deleted). Accord-

ing to petitioner, “[t]his official misinformation carried

the weight of a court decision and was enough to convince

a pro se litigant (and some lawyers) that the 90-day win-

dow for filing a certiorari petition expired, as well.” Ibid.

The State, however, represents that petitioner erroneously

filed the petition for rehearing under the case number of

an earlier, dismissed appeal. Brief for Respondent 4. I do

not know how to resolve these allegations, but this only

highlights the propriety of a remand. Even on the State’s

version of events, petitioner’s attempt at filing for rehear-

ing is proof of diligence on his part.

Putting these allegations aside, the Court’s reasoning is

too parsimonious. While petitioner could have shown even

greater diligence by seeking rehearing for a second time

and then filing for certiorari, we have never held pro se

prisoners to the standards of counseled litigants. See, e.g.,

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972) (per curiam). In-

deed, petitioner’s situation contrasts dramatically with

that of the movant in the case the Court relies on, Acker-

mann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193 (1950). See ante, at

13. In upholding the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief in

Ackermann, the Court put great emphasis on the fact that

——————

1999, and remanded the COA for a determination of which specific

issues merited permission to appeal. On remand, petitioner filed a new

application for a COA, but this time the District Court denied the

request. Petitioner then filed a timely appeal, and the District Court

granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The Court

of Appeals then declined to issue a COA and dismissed the appeal on

April 6, 2000.

Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7

STEVENS, J., dissenting

the movant had the benefit of paid counsel and that, for

much of the relevant period, he was not detained, but

rather enjoyed “freedom of movement and action,” 340

U. S., at 201.6 In any event, I believe that our rules gov-

erning prisoner litigation should favor a policy of repose

rather than a policy that encourages multiple filings with

a low probability of success.7

Accordingly, I agree with the Court’s conclusion that

petitioner filed a “true” Rule 60(b) motion. I respectfully

dissent, however, because of the Court’s decision to rule on

the merits of the motion in the first instance.

——————

6 Ackermann is further distinguishable in that it did not involve the

sort of plain error of law that has been identified in this case. But even

if Ackermann were not distinguishable, I would find the views ex-

pressed by Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas in dissent, see 340

U. S. at 202 (opinion of Black, J.), more persuasive than those ex-

pressed by Justice Minton.

7 A petition for certiorari seeking review of a denial of a COA has an

objectively low chance of being granted. Such a decision is not thought

to present a good vehicle for resolving legal issues, and error-correction

is a disfavored basis for granting review, particularly in noncapital

cases. See generally this Court’s Rule 10. As for the fact that this

Court granted certiorari in Artuz eight days after the Eleventh Circuit

denied petitioner a COA, it would be unrealistic to fault petitioner for

failing to capitalize on this fortuity. In my experience, even lower

courts and counseled litigants are often not aware of our grants of

certiorari on issues that may be relevant to their current business. It

would be particularly inappropriate to impose such a strict expectation

on a pro se prisoner, particularly in the absence of any indication of

when, given his circumstances in prison, he could have reasonably been

expected to learn of our grant in Artuz.