“Plea agreements are contractual in nature, so we use traditional contract law principles in interpreting and enforcing them.”
How later courts described this case
- “Plea agreements are contractual in nature, so we use traditional contract law principles in interpreting and enforcing them.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority’s reading of the plea agreement in this case and therefore dissent. Under the agreement’s plain language, Harris had an obligation to provide the government with a complete statement pertaining to the information to which he pled guilty and all other counterfeit securities activities in which he was involved or of which he had knowledge. He agreed to provide the statement prior to entry of his guilty plea, although he did not in fact do so. He also agreed to submit to supplemental debriefing on counterfeit securities matters when requested by the government at any time.
Onto this rather straightforward, simple agreement the majority grafts two provisions not included in its terms — an obligation on the part of the government to contact Harris to give him an opportunity to make a statement and an obligation on the part of the government to question Harris in order to obtain his statement. The majority also reads the agreement in a way that deletes a clear requirement under its terms — Harris is relieved of his obligation to make a complete statement as defined in the agreement. In so doing, the majority creates a scenario that is not based on the agreement but rather its own set of expectations about how matters should have proceeded between Harris and the government.
Whatever duty the government might have to interview a defendant in other contexts and under other agreements, under this agreement there was no such duty. In order to avoid prosecution for counterfeit securities charges not covered in the information, Harris had to make a complete statement, even in the absence of any initiating action by the government. The agreement is silent as to the statement’s form; Harris or his counsel could have submitted a written statement in letter or other form or could have made an appointment with government representatives to give an oral statement. The obligation was that of Harris, not the government.
The district court’s finding of fact that Harris did not give a statement is not clearly erroneous. Thus, Harris breached the agreement by failing to give a complete statement initially, and the government was free to prosecute him in the Dayton case. Harris also likely breached the agreement in refusing Shink’s request for interview, although the majority correctly notes that the record is sketchy on this issue. But we need not resolve the issue of whether the refusal of a request for interview was a breach because Harris had already breached the agreement in failing to give a complete statement.
We should affirm Harris’s conviction.