stating that “[t]he force employed was appropriate to the task at hand” when officer “forcefully threw” a plaintiff to the ground, pinned him down, and placed his weight on plaintiff’s back before handcuffing him even though plaintiff was only “passively resistant”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[t]he force employed was appropriate to the task at hand” when officer “forcefully threw” a plaintiff to the ground, pinned him down, and placed his weight on plaintiff’s back before handcuffing him even though plaintiff was only “passively resistant”
- reasoning, “relatively minor scrapes and bruises and the less-than-permanent aggravation of a prior shoulder condition were de minimis injuries that support[ed] the conclusion that [the officer] did not use excessive force” against an arrestee
- concluding that officer who “forcefully threw” passively resisting plaintiff to the ground, pinned plaintiff down, and put his weight on plaintiff’s back before handcuffing him did not use excessive force
- holding that when a driver failed to comply with an officer's orders to get out of the vehicle, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to pull the driver from the truck and handcuff him
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write separately as I believe the actions undertaken by Chief Police Krueger, when viewed in the light most favorable to Richard Wertish, demonstrate a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. While the police *1068 were justified in stopping Wertish’s vehicle based on his erratic driving, I agree with the district court which found the actions following the stop constituted a constitutional violation. The evidence shows Krueger forcefully threw Wertish to the ground upon opening his car door, handcuffed him after pinning him down and placing his weight on Wertish’s back, and then picked him up and threw him into his own vehicle with sufficient force, ironically, to cause his body to produce insulin and regain awareness of his surroundings. Because Krueger continued to use force against Wertish when the evidence demonstrates he was not resisting arrest, Wertish has shown a constitutional violation.
I agree, however, with the ultimate conclusion here as Krueger’s actions were covered under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Once a constitutional violation is established, we need to examine the circumstances objectively to determine if he acted reasonably, taking into account situations in which an “officer ... correctly perceive[s] all of the relevant facts but [has] a mistaken understanding as to whether [the] particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). In other words, qualified immunity protects officers in situations involving the “hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.” Id. at 206, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (citation omitted).
This case involves the “hazy border.” While Krueger used excessive force against Wertish, he was mistaken as to the true nature of the situation at hand. See McGruder v. Heagwood, 197 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir.1999) (holding officers acted reasonably in apprehending a suspect by pulling him out of a car when the officers mistakenly believed the subject to be a flight risk). Krueger had no reason to believe Wertish was diabetic until Wertish mentioned his condition after being slammed into his own vehicle. Up to that point, Krueger could reasonably believe Wertish was an intoxicated driver refusing to cooperate and carrying a knife. Because Wertish was not demonstrating any classic symptoms of a person suffering a diabetic episode, my belief is “no reasonable officer” would have known Krueger’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758, 766 (8th Cir.2001). Thus, his actions are protected under the doctrine of qualified immunity.